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A potentially serious gap exists in the preparedness of the public health system to 
respond to terrorism: risk communication.  Unless this system is better structured to 
provide American citizens with a clear understanding of the potential risks and hazards 
associated with a terrorist event – particularly a bio-terrorism event – citizens not only 
run the risk of taking inappropriate protective actions, but also of experiencing increased 
(and potentially debilitating) levels of fear.  
This thesis argues that risk communication is a vital contributor to successful 
homeland security prevention, response and recovery efforts.  The response of the public 
health sector to the Anthrax attacks of 2001 offered important lessons for the federal 
government in successful (and unsuccessful) risk communication. Unfortunately, 
however, many of these lessons have not been applied by state and local public health 
organizations – organizations that are likely to be on the front lines of any bio-terror 
attack.  This thesis will also show that state public health organizations are overly 
optimistic in assessing their capacity for risk communication, and could benefit from 
capacity-building proposals that can be derived from the 2001 Anthrax events.  I analyze 
these proposals for change and examine how they could best be implemented in state 
public health emergency response planning. 
In a survey I conducted of public health officials in an eleven state region (which 
includes my own state, Colorado) I found that significant opportunities for improvement 
exist in their emergency preparedness planning.  Of particular concern, is the states’ 
limited risk communication planning.  Nonetheless, there was a high level of confidence 
in the states’ perceived level of preparedness to respond and communicate risks during a 
potential bio-terrorism event. 
A number of practical measures might be taken to remedy these gaps in planning.  
The simplest remedy is promotion of existing tools that facilitate risk communication 
planning- specifically the CDCynergy product discussed later in this thesis under 
recommendations.  Furthermore, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
 xvi
should create a mechanism to more broadly share valuable lessons learned from their 
response to Anthrax.  This mechanism or forum could also serve as a site for best practice 
applications compiled from state and local public health agencies involved in Anthrax 
and other large scale emergency responses.  As a long term solution, the creation of a 
nationwide comprehensive secured repository of resources, computer based training 
materials, and communication support products as well as subject matter expert contact 
information would be beneficial.  The repository could address planning deficits with 
ready-made products and facilitate discussions between public health emergency 
response leaders across state boundaries enabling uniform solutions to regional shortfalls.   
Ultimately, there are various means of addressing planning weaknesses but the 
solutions depend on the ability to of public health agencies to acknowledge and clearly 
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response to Anthrax.  This mechanism or forum could also serve as a site for best practice 
applications compiled from state and local public health agencies involved in Anthrax 
and other large scale emergency responses.  As a long term solution, the creation of a 
nationwide comprehensive secured repository of resources, computer based training 
materials, and communication support products as well as subject matter expert contact 
information would be beneficial.  The repository could address planning deficits with 
ready-made products and facilitate discussions between public health emergency 
response leaders across state boundaries enabling uniform solutions to regional shortfalls.   
Ultimately, there are various means of addressing planning weaknesses but the 
solutions depend on the ability to of public health agencies to acknowledge and clearly 
identify the various aspects of the problem.  
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM 
The importance of risk communication reflects the transformation of public health 
into a key contributor to the war against terrorism.  Prior to the 2001 World Trade Center 
and Anthrax attacks, the role of public health agencies was one of in-depth scientific 
research and provision of community based health services.  Now, the challenge to public 
health lies in its ability not only to fulfill these roles, but also to provide the public with 
effective, timely advice on how to respond to bio-terrorism.  Terrorism involving 
biological agents will place special burdens on public health.  In other terrorist attacks, 
whether they involve conventional means or chemical or even nuclear weapons, the 
existence of the attack is obvious at the moment it occurs.  In bio-terrorism, in contrast, 
there may be a delay between release of an agent and the appearance of disease, and there 
may be great uncertainties concerning the nature of the disease, its potential to spread, 
and the best means of prevention and treatment.  These problems will guarantee that 
public health officials play a central role and will require them to communicate 
extensively with the public and other officials about risk.  
Extensive research on communicating risks from environmental hazards to 
various publics shows that the risk communication process involves far more than then 
simply communicating information in a crisis.  As risk is defined as a “possibility of loss 
or injury” it is natural that the public seeks information immediately from valued sources 
to reduce their anxiety and to facilitate decision-making to protect themselves, their 
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families and their communities. Effective risk communication requires specific 
communication skills as well as an understanding of the influence of spokespersons and 
messages on the audience. 
Research on risk communication also highlights the potential consequences of 
failed communication strategies.  An analysis of different strategies used to communicate 
the risks of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) is included in this thesis.  This 
international disease event provided a unique opportunity to examine the pros and cons of 
various communication approaches used to define the risks associated with an unknown 
and deadly pathogen.  The commodity at stake in the risk communication process is the 
trust of the potentially impacted community in the messenger as well as the message 
itself.  Since the message is intended to compel the community to take specific actions to 
protect themselves and their families, this loss of trust ultimately undermines the 
foundation of the public health response.  Furthermore, a poor communication approach 
sets the stage for increased fear reactions in the populace and a movement away from 
community wide post-event recovery. 
In order to assure that best possible approach to the preparedness process, the 
crisis and risk communication functions in bio-terrorism response must be critical 
adjuncts to traditional functions essential to reducing the impact of a public health event.  
Effective risk communication preparedness and planning will prove to be the most 
critical determinant of the ability of public health organizations to successfully maintain 
public trust, reduce fear and uncertainty, and guide effective actions to be taken to reduce 
impacts to individuals and the community.   
B. METHODOLOGY AND THESIS STRUCTURE 
To assess the degree to which states have incorporated lessons from the Anthrax 
attacks, and from emerging best practices and findings in the academic literature, I 
conducted a survey of officials in an eleven state region.  This survey region was selected 
to include all states within the Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) Region VIII as well as all states bordering the State of 
Colorado serving as a central focal point for the purposes of this research.  As bio-
terrorism events do not recognize political boundaries, the goal of this survey was to 
determine the level of regional planning as it relates to the potential for successful 
4 
outcomes in a public health risk communication process.  Data on the timing of the 
integration of bio-terrorism oriented risk communication efforts to the increased 
availability of funding was also used to predict the impact of future public health 
emergency preparedness funding reductions, should they occur.  I also integrate the 
findings from the survey with lessons learned by impacted organizations, such as the 
CDC, and impacted communities including Palm Beach, Florida and New York City, 
New York.   
Chapter II shows how, until quite recently, the U.S. public health system was 
allowed to deteriorate and describes recent efforts to address some of these deficits 
through increased funding for bio-terrorism preparedness.  It also reviews responses to 
the SARS outbreak in China, Canada and Singapore in order to illustrate the impact of 
different approaches to risk communication.  Chapter III summarizes existing research on 
effective risk communication to show why careful planning and practice are likely to be 
critical for effective bio-terrorism response, and it reviews lessons learned from the 
Anthrax attacks and other relevant events.  Chapter IV assesses the progress that is being 
made in applying those lessons learned in an eleven state region of the United States and 
analyzes the continuing shortfalls in state preparedness.  Chapter V offers 
recommendations for future programmatic change and research.  It draws especial 
attention to the need to develop national standards and templates that could provide 
guidelines for state agencies, and it stresses the need to maintain the funding commitment 
to public health so that states can continue to improve their preparedness to respond to 
possible bio-terrorist incidents. 
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II. PUBLIC HEALTH IN BIO-TERRORISM RESPONSE 
A. ADDRESSING DISEASE AS A WEAPON 
In the fall of 1992, the Institute of Medicine within the U.S. National Academy of 
Science released a report called Emerging Infections: Microbial Threats to Health in the 
United States.  This report noted that “the emergence of infectious diseases in the United 
States was genuine and authorities were ill equipped to anticipate or manage new 
epidemics.”1   As a result of this report, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) undertook a process to enhance their surveillance capabilities and prepare for 
rapid response to disease outbreaks.  This initiative built upon findings from the annual 
meeting of the American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene in December 1989 
where role-playing an epidemic situation identified weaknesses in the public health 
emergency response system.2  It was obvious that the public health system was 
challenged when dealing with naturally occurring disease under normal circumstances. 
Coupled with these structural public health weaknesses was a growing concern 
about the potential for use of disease as a weapon.  American scientists were actively 
seeking new tools and processes to identify disease earlier and more efficiently.  In 1993, 
Stephen Morse and ProMED, a research project supported by the Federation of American 
Scientists, organized a meeting at the World Health Organization (WHO) headquarters in 
Geneva, Switzerland to discuss ways of monitoring disease and other issues contributing 
to the public health – agricultural crops, livestock, wild-caught animals, and sampled 
water supply.  During the meeting, Dr. Barbara Rosenberg of the Federation of American 
Scientists acknowledged, 
The perception is growing that more needs to be done to prevent the 
emergence of new epidemics.  This perception comes from both the bio-
weapons and public health communities.3
 
 
1 Laurie Garrett, The Coming Plague Newly Emerging Diseases in a World Out of Balance (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1995, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1994), 7. 
2 Ibid., 593. 
3 Garrett, The Coming Plague, 602. 
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On May 11, 1993, the CDC staged a meeting to discuss the ultimate disposition of 
the smallpox stocks.  At that meeting, the CDC released information about the bio-
weapons program obtained from defectors of the former Soviet Union.  Following that 
fateful meeting, Minnesota state epidemiologist Mike Osterholm remarked that he 
realized that only public health had the ability to address the disease issues directly tied a 
bio-terrorism event.  In the meantime, “(he was) watching the infrastructure for public 
health in this country deteriorate.”4
Not until the late 1990’s did the scientific community begin to accept that bio-
terrorism was a serious threat.  Joshua Lederberg and D.A. Henderson, senior public 
health leaders in disease eradication issues around the world, came forward to focus the 
attention of public health on this evolving threat.  They scoffed at the concept that 
naturally occurring disease could not be weaponized, that the public was protected by 
sufficient supplies of vaccines and antibiotics and that no organization would 
purposefully seek the skills necessary to release disease on society.  According to 
Henderson, “We know that there are nations and dissident groups that have both the 
motivation and access to skills to selectively cultivate some of the most dangerous 
pathogens and to deploy them as agents in acts of terrorism or war.”5  Henderson sought 
to compel public health to take bio-terrorism seriously.  Henderson was supported by 
CDC’s Dr. Scott Lillibridge in a statement of concurrence.  
My extreme concern…is that these events will exploit vulnerabilities in 
our public health system.  The lack of capacity at the local level means 
[biological] isolates may not be confirmed in a timely manner.  
Preparedness must include the public health community as a full partner.6
The stage was set to alter the approach to public health, but resources were not 
available to move the concept forward.  
On March 20, 1995, the Aum Shinrikyo cult released sarin in the Tokyo subway 
crowded with passengers making their way to work.  In the end, 3,938 people were 
 
4 Laurie Garrett, Betrayal of Trust – The Collapse of Global Public Health. (New York: Hyperion, 
2000), 488. 
5 Ibid., 494. 
6 Garrett, Betrayal of Trust, 495. 
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injured in the attack and twelve died. 7  Investigation into this attack revealed that the cult 
had attempted acts of bio-terrorism earlier utilizing Anthrax, botulinum toxin and Query 
(Q) Fever and that they had tried to obtain and develop weapons using Ebola.  A few 
days afterward, Joshua Lederberg was called to meet with President Bill Clinton, Vice-
President Al Gore and the administration’s cabinet to discuss means of preventing 
chemical, biological and nuclear attacks.  Lederberg responded that,  
In the nuclear field there is some room for detection.  It is much more 
difficult in the chemical, and biological area – it is next to impossible.8
The Aum Shinrikyo attack served as a wake-up call to the world.  There were 
organizations that not only had the interest in developing weapons of mass destruction 
but also had the means. 
As information evolved on the capabilities of terrorist organizations such as the 
Aum Shinrikyo, information was also being released about bio-weapon activities in the 
former Soviet Union.  Although when challenged by President George Bush in a 1992 
meeting, Boris Yeltsin claimed no knowledge of the Soviet Biopreparat bio-weapons 
program, he asked General Anatoly Kuntsevich to prepare a report.  The report released 
later that year described a program immense in scope.   
Dozens of killers had been weaponized for missile, rocket, and aerial 
bomb delivery, including anthrax, Q Fever, tularemia, and a host of 
viruses.  And these weapons were tested over the years on Vozrozhdeniya 
Island located in the middle of the rapidly receding Aral Sea.9   
Also in 1992, Dr. Kanatjan Alibekov (Ken Alibek), a bio-weapons researcher 
since 1975 and the deputy chief of the Soviet program since 1987, defected to the West 
from Russia bringing with him specific information on the country’s weapons program.  
Alibek claimed that during the time he served in a leadership capacity, Biopreparat 
employed 32,000 scientists and civilians while the Ministry of Defense maintained a staff 
of another 10,000 military scientists.  When asked where all of these skilled bio-weapons 
workers went after the fall of the Soviet Union, Dr. Alibek’s response was simply 
 
7 Jonathan B. Tucker, ed., Toxic Terror – Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological 
Weapons (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), 218-219. 
8 Garrett, Betrayal of Trust, 496. 
9 Ibid., 512. 
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“Nobody knows.”10  With the uncontrolled availability of resources and technical 
knowledge from the former weapons programs coupled with interest from hostile nations 
and terrorist organizations, the stage was set for a potential bio-terrorism event in the 
United States. 
As these apparent and ominous biological threats came to light, it further 
illuminated the weaknesses of public health as a critical infrastructure.  In the late 1990’s, 
the Department of Defense trained 27 cities in terrorism response under the auspices of 
the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act but much of the focus was on traditional first responders.  
Again, D.A. Henderson stepped to the forefront in saying the purpose of the training was 
wrong.  There needed to be a sustained long-term effort to prepare emergency room and 
public health personnel, firefighters and police.11  Between 1997 and 1999, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigations also trained almost 70,000 hazardous materials response team 
personnel to respond to a bio-terrorism attack as if it were no different than a chemical 
attack.  Michael Osterholm was quick to point out that this was an ineffective means of 
addressing use of disease as a weapon:  
Biological weapons cause diseases that exist in nature and may occur 
spontaneously in human populations…The investigation steps for 
detection and identification of the agent would be the same as that for a 
naturally occurring agent.  Therefore, the first and most fundamental 
strategy for dealing with bio-terrorism was to develop effective means for 
combating all infectious diseases…improving the public health 
infrastructure and biomedical research capacity.12
While the nation struggled with how to prepare to respond to a terrorism threat, 
Senator Bill Frist (R-TN) and Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) were moving forward with 
the Frist-Kennedy Public Health Improvement Act of 2000.  This legislation was 
intended to strengthen basic and long-standing infrastructure shortfalls in public health 
while also providing “the first line of defense against terrorism and many other threats to 
the public health.”13  After the 2001 attacks on the United States, Senators Frist and 
 
10 Ibid., 513. 
11 D. A. Henderson, “The looming Threat of Bio-Terrorism,” (1999) 283:1279-82 as quoted by Laurie 
Garrett, 528. 
12 Garrett, Betrayal of Trust, 540. 
13 Sen. Ted Kennedy, Frist-Kennedy Public Health Improvement Act of 2000 Update, [Presentation 
on-line] (July 2001. Accessed 16 February 2004); Available from 
http://www.naccho.org/downloadfile2.cfm?filenamex=General380.pdf, Internet: 3. 
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Kennedy again partnered to craft the Bio-terrorism Act of 2001.  This act, co-sponsored 
by a bi-partisan group of 71 senators, called for $3.2 billion in additional public health 
funding in 2002 to combat bio-terrorism with a commitment to maintain this level of 
funding in the coming years.14  With the identification of interest in the use of bio-
weapons by terrorist groups and rogue nations, the availability of technical expertise to 
create or use bio-weapons, and funding to undertake serious preparedness activities, the 
culture and focus of public health changed.  
B. RISK COMMUNICATION AS A COMPONENT OF BIO-TERROR 
PREPAREDNESS 
Effective public health leadership must include a focus on preparedness and 
planning not only for disease surveillance, detection and response but also its ability to 
communicate the associated risks in a meaningful fashion to the citizens of the 
community.  As state health officials strive to address a constantly growing list of public 
health threats while confronting issues of limited staff and diminishing funds for other 
health programs, bio-terrorism funding and priorities have proven to be both a blessing 
and a curse.  Public health responsibilities are broad and varied as public health workers 
strive to communicate on a myriad of prevention and treatment issues.  As stated by 
Seattle Public Health Director Alonzo Plough when discussing the plight of state and 
local health agencies caught in the crossfire, “Terrorism may be the least of their 
concerns.”15  Decades of research in risk communication clearly demonstrate that citizens 
can better understand and emotionally assimilate the details of a risky situation if the 
information on the risk is from a trustworthy source.  Communication researchers noted 
in 1967 that all messages have both content and relationship elements that transmit 
information in context based on the association of the sender and the audience.16  The 
ability of the public health system to be perceived as a trustworthy communication source 
 
14 American Society for Microbiology, Summary of the Frist-Kennedy Bio-terrorism Preparedness Act 
of 2001, [on-line] (Accessed 16 February 2004.) Available from 
http://www.asm.org/ASM/files/LEFTMARGINHEADERLIST/DOWNLOADFILENAME/0000000557/bi
obilllsum1765%5B1%5D.html, Internet. 
15 Christopher Conte, “Deadly Strains,” Governing, [on-line] (June 2003, Accessed 19 December 
2003), Available from http://www.governing.com/archive/2003/jun/health.txt, Internet. 
16 P. Watzlawick, J. H. Beavin, and D. D. Jackson, “Pragmatics of Human Communication: A Study 
of Interactional Patterns, Pathologies and Paradoxes” (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, Inc., 1967) quoted 
in Marsha L. Vanderford, “Communication Lessons Learned in the Emergency Operations Center During 
CDC’s Anthrax Response: A Commentary,” Journal of Health Communication 8, Supplement 1 (2003): 
11-12. 
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is dependent on its ability to communicate the risks in a timely and meaningful fashion to 
the citizens of the community.  This thesis will outline the challenges of communicating 
risk prior to, during and following a bio-terrorism event as well as the relationship 
between the content of the risk communication message and public health officials as 
messengers. 
As the American people strive to understand technology-based threats in today’s 
world of potential terrorism events on native soil, the effectiveness of public health rests 
on the ability of the system to communicate the risks to the citizens.  In the last two 
hundred years, public health in the United States has evolved from a mechanism to treat 
sick mariners who were deemed critical to the new nation’s security and trade to a $539 
billion organization.17  This federal organization leads a generally cooperative, though 
not directly conjoined, affiliation of state and local public health agencies now charged 
with protecting the nation against a myriad of health concerns including bio-terrorism.  
The focus and purview of the system has been altered drastically.  Public health before 
September 11, 2001 was able to commit a majority of its time and available resources to 
meticulously tracking down the origin and impact of diseases and providing detailed 
guidance for an appropriate response based on thorough scientific research, analysis and 
debate.  The public health system today is called upon to quickly identify and treat 
diseases purposefully introduced into the population to disrupt and disable the American 
government and cause fear in its people.  When an event occurs, there is no time for 
thorough testing and scientific validation of assumptions, yet the leaders of the nation, the 
media and the citizens need to know what to do.  The public health system can and will 
respond.  The acid test will be whether the system can and will communicate what it 
knows and does not know quickly enough and effectively enough that it creates a 
trustworthy source and whether the nation responds appropriately with minimal societal 
disruption.  Public health bio-terrorism response will not be judged on what it does but on 
what it says. 
 
 
17 Department of Health and Human Services, FY 2004 Budget in Brief,   [Budget summary on-line] 
(Washington, D.C., Accessed 16 January, 2004.) Available from 
http://www.hhs.gov/budget/04budget/fy2004bib.pdf, 2 of 103. 
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Prior to the attacks of 2001, public health as a system was a critical infrastructure 
in disrepair.  As lawmakers witnessed the successes in eliminating diseases such as 
smallpox and polio, funding was allowed to progressively decrease until the system itself 
was weakened and under-resourced.  Senate Majority Leader, Dr. Bill Frist noted, “over 
the past two decades, the [nation’s public health] infrastructure has greatly 
deteriorated.”18  The Center for Studying Health Care Change undertook a study in April 
1996 to examine the capabilities of the public health system.  Their report targets the 
limited resources in the wake of increasing private health care costs and a changing 
society with complex health care issues which looks more often to the community based 
system for care and treatment.  Their findings noted:  
Foremost among the pressures on the system are the diminished levels of 
state and local funding and the increased fragmentation of public health 
responsibilities among nontraditional partners in the community.  As a 
result of these and other pressures, the tools and strategies used to address 
the delivery of public health in the past may not be adequate or 
appropriate today or in the future.19
The report quantified the decrease in funding for public health by highlighting 
that, in 1993, less than 1% of the U.S. health care dollars went to public health.  This 
statistic represented a 1.7% reduction since 1990 alone.  Ironically, as dollars decreased, 
the public health system core capacities required that the system be responsible for 
“preventing epidemics…[and] responding to disasters.”20  In the face of limited dollars 
and competing priorities, there was no room to build capacity to respond to emergencies, 
particularly of the scope experienced in 2001. 
On September 11, the nation found itself struggling with issues of ensuring public 
safety and, almost immediately, the focus of public health changed from generalized 
community health to addressing concerns raised by a potential bio-terrorism event.  The 
following year, Congress passed the Bio-terrorism Act of 2002 and appropriated $2 
billion to support public health and improve the preparedness functions of this 
 
18 Bill Frist, M.D., “Public Health and National Security: The Critical Role of Increased Federal 
Support,” Health Affairs, Volume 21, Number 6. (November/December 2002:119 (Photocopy) Available 
from ProQuest. 
19 Centers for Studying Health Care Change, “Tracking Changes in the Public Health System: What 




                                                
infrastructure to detect and respond to an act of terrorism aimed at causing illness in the 
populace.21  Over $1 billion was spent simply upgrading public health laboratory 
capacity, and updating and modernizing computer systems in order for agencies to share 
information rapidly nationwide.  The early phases of bio-terrorism preparedness began 
with establishing the most fundamental mechanisms to determine if an event had 
occurred and to send a warning to partners in the nation.  State and local health agencies 
were called upon to draft emergency plans, gather and stock protective and 
communications equipment, and to undertake a rigorous process of training and 
exercising of their new plans.  Paradoxically, there was little focus on planning for crisis 
or risk communication to the public on a topic that is, at the same time, frightening and 
technically complex. 
Although included in concept through many components of the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) bio-terrorism grant funding, it was not until 
Budget Year Three (2002-2003) that risk communications took a position of relative 
significance in public health emergency preparedness.  In 2001, the nation watched the 
events surrounding a diagnosis of Anthrax-caused health effects in Florida, Washington 
D.C. and New York unfold before them while the public health system struggled to 
identify and quantify the risks for the public.  The CDC estimates there are 57 diseases 
which are likely vectors for bio-terrorism, but for which no countermeasures exist.22  
This statistic alone presents a mammoth challenge to public health communicators should 
these diseases ever be used as weapons and the communicators called upon to explain 
them and the potential impacts to citizens.  Project Bio-Shield was funded for a supposed 
$5.6 billion under the Bio-terrorism Act of 2002 to increase interest by pharmaceutical 
companies in biomedical research and development of pharmaceutical counter-
 
21 House of Representatives, Select Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness 
and Response, House Select Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness and Response 
Holds Hearing on Disease Surveillance Systems. 108th Cong., (24 September 2003).  Accessed through 
http://www.cq.com. (Accessed 25 October 2003):1. 
22 Progressive Policy Institute, America at Risk: Homeland Security Report Card [report on-line] 
(Washington, D.C., July 2003, Accessed 16 January 2004); Available from 
http://www.ppionline.org/documents/HomeSecRptCrd_0703.pdf, Internet, 21. 
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measures.23  However, even if Bio-Shield results in positive outcomes for prophylaxing 
and treating bio-terror victims, public health will still have the responsibility of 
recommending the course of treatment and communicating the risks associated with its 
implementation.  Without an effective strategy to develop and disseminate information on 
risk directly to the leadership and citizens of this country, it is likely that the level of fear 
will increase drastically and negative consequences will result. 
C. ASSESSING THE CRITICALITY OF RISK COMMUNICATION: 
SEVERE ACUTE RESPIRATORY SYNDROME (SARS) 
The 2002 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak exemplifies the 
role of effective communication in dealing with a deadly disease outbreak in which 
limited scientific data is available.  It also shows how politics and communications have 
the potential of becoming intertwined in a public health emergency.  During a 
presentation on public health preparedness, Dr. Kristine Gebbie, Director of the 
Columbia University Center for Health Policy and Health Services Research, remarked: 
Public health is ‘political health’…(and) that requires outside partners.  
Politics is NOT science based.24  
Dr. Gebbie’s intent was to demonstrate that effective public health preparedness 
and response will necessitate interaction and communication with many partners both 
within and outside the health and medical communities.  That being said, internal as well 
as interagency politics are likely to influence the process but cannot stand in the way of 
necessary public health response, particularly communication.  At the same symposium 
with Dr. Gebbie, Pulitzer prize-winning science author Laurie Garrett outlined the 
political differences between the public health response and fear reaction to SARS in 
China and in Toronto.  Key to the differences was the availability of risk information and 
the perceived credibility of the government agency delivering the message.25  
 
 
23  House of Representatives, Select Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness 
and Response, House Select Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness and Response 
Holds Hearing on Disease Surveillance Systems. 108th Cong., (24 September 2003). Accessed through 
http://www.cq.com. (Accessed 25 October 2003):1. 
24 Kristine Gebbie, (Public Health Leadership Symposium, 8 August 2003. Fort Lewis College) 
Durango, Colorado. 
25 Laurie Garrett, (Public Health Leadership Symposium, 8 August 2003. Fort Lewis College) 
Durango, Colorado. 
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D. RISK COMMUNICATION FOR SUDDEN ACUTE RESPIRATORY 
SYNDROME (SARS) 
China, being the first nation to see the presentation of SARS, struggled with the 
implications of communicating regarding this new and deadly disease.  The World Health 
Organization (WHO) developed a report in May 2003 on SARS and lessons learned for 
the immediate future.  While examining in depth the mechanics of communication to 
reduce disease transmission, the WHO also identified the politics that play into the ability 
to communicate outside the health community to control an outbreak.  The WHO was 
able to determine during their epidemiological investigation that SARS first appeared in 
the Guangdong Province in mid-November 2002 but cases were not reported.  This delay 
allowed this new disease to take hold and spread.  This communication delay also 
increased the possibility of creating a global outbreak.  The WHO report states: 
This is the most important lesson for all nations: in a globalized 
electronically connected world, attempts to conceal cases of an infectious 
disease for fear of social and economic consequences must be recognized 
as a stop gap measure that carries a very high price.26
The report goes on to talk about the fear created around the world when SARS 
information was limited or not deemed as trustworthy. 
…this fear of SARS has spread faster than the virus, causing great social 
unease, economic losses, and some political changes.  Unwarranted 
discrimination has been another unfortunate problem.  In such cases, clear, 
factual, and reassuring messages need to be issued by trusted authorities.  
Panic is fueled when information is concealed or only partially 
disclosed.27
As opposed to the China situation, the Toronto SARS outbreak provides a mid-
point example of risk communication strategies that were effective in some ways and 
criticized in others.  Some of the Canadian dilemmas could be encountered in the United 
States if we were confronted with a bio-terrorism event.  Effective communication was 
seen as the cornerstone of the city’s response plan to stop the spread of the disease.  
Toronto officials provided constant website updates, daily news conferences and 
information updates in eight languages, and set up hotlines that handled more than 
 
26 World Health Organization, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS): Status of the Outbreak 
and Lessons for the Immediate Future, [report on-line] (20 May 2003, Accessed 20 February 2004) 
Available from http://www.who.int/csr/media/sars_wha.pdf, Internet, 8. 
27 Ibid. 
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300,000 calls (47,567 calls in one day at its peak)28.  At the same time, this robust 
communication process was seen as a distraction by Canadian public health leaders.  
While commending Singapore for their communication strategy, Canadian health 
officials added that the value in the Singapore approach was it “(left) public health 
officials and infectious disease experts to focus on the outbreak.”29  A Gallup poll of 
Torontonians conducted while SARS was still taking lives indicated that two-thirds were 
either “satisfied” (48%) or “very satisfied” (21%) with the government’s efforts.30  This 
data was in follow-up to another Gallup poll that indicated that 93% of the city’s 
population had heard about the disease and 79% reported following the SARS situation at 
least one time each day.31  A community that remains engaged in the communication 
process as the outbreak unfolds and reports satisfaction with the communicators is an 
indicator that the process is working effectively. 
Unfortunately, as the community showed appreciation for the public risk 
communication process, the communication strategy within medical facilities in Canada 
was faulted because of perceived inadequate information provision to their staffs.  Over 
40% of Torontonians infected with SARS were health care workers.32  Nurses 
associations in Canada complained that hospital administrators were not taking adequate 
measures to protect them from SARS and they were not informed on procedures to 
follow to stop the spread within the hospitals.  During the second SARS outbreak in 
Toronto, 93% of the disease cases were acquired in a hospital setting.33
 
28 Bonnie J. Henry, “Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Overview” (Presentation at the 
National Disaster Medical System Disaster Response Conference 2004, 19 April 2004, Dallas, Texas) 
Written notes. 
29 National Advisory Council on SARS and Public Health, Learning from SARS – Renewal of Public 
Health in Canada [report on-line] (Health Canada Publications, October 2003, Accessed 22 March 2004) 
Available on-line from http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/english/pdf/sars/sars-e.pdf, Internet, 32. 
30 Josephine Mezzucca, “Torontonians Rate Government’s SARS Response,” The Gallup 
Organization – Toronto Bureau, (29 April 2003, Accessed 22 March 2004) Available on-line at 
http://www.gallup.com/content; Internet. 
31 Josephine Mezzucca, “SARS: Toronto Residents Alert, Not Alarmed,” The Gallup Organization – 
Toronto Bureau (22 April 2003, Accessed 22 March 2004) Available from http://www.gallup.com/content, 
Internet. 
32 National Advisory Council on SARS and Public Health, 32. 
33 Connie Savor Price, “SARS: the Toronto Experience” (Presentation at the SARS Preparedness 
Conference, 9 January 2004, Denver, Colorado); Written Notes. 
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Nurses and support staff expressed frustration with communication delays, 
(and) impractical or unrealistic directives…Hospital employees described 
a wide range of feelings – including fear, anger, guilt and confusion – as 
they struggled with personal risks, social isolation, and stigmatization of 
their families.34
Ultimately, this led to critical staff avoiding the work environment and further 
reduction of the capabilities of an already stressed system.  The quality and quantity of 
the information on SARS had a direct impact – both positive and negative – on the health 
response in Toronto.  In the end, one of the National Advisory Council on SARS and 
Public Health recommendations to Health Canada was to “develop and provide training 
programs and tools to support local public health units and institutions in systematically 
developing, implementing and evaluating crisis and emergency risk communication 
strategies.”35  
On the other hand, noted risk communication researcher Peter Sandman and his 
collaborator Dr. Jody Lanard highlight the successful risk communications strategy 
undertaken by Singapore as it addressed SARS in its population. 
Of course the most important factors in managing SARS are medical. But 
risk communication matters also, and…Singapore has done state-of-the-art 
risk communication.  Typically, leaders and public health officials tend to 
box with the public's fear, as if trying to knock it out.  Risk 
communication in a crisis is more jiu-jitsu than boxing — respecting the 
public’s fear, allying with it, and helping the public pivot on its fear 
toward appropriate vigilance, attentive learning, and productive 
preparedness.36  
Beyond the strategy of openness used in Canada, Singapore focused on response 
based on absolute honesty.  Drs. Lanard and Sandman distinguish a difference in 
approach that precluded “over-reassurance” by public officials that can turn and cause the 
community to feel “outrage, doubt, and sometimes even panic.”  Rather than focusing on 
appearing confident, officials in Singapore recognized the lack of clear information and 
helped their citizens come to terms with the emotions tied to the uncertainty.  Most 
 
34 National Advisory Council on SARS and Public Health, 41. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Jody Lanard and Peter M. Sandman, “SARS Communication: What Singapore Is Doing Right” [full 
unpublished version for The (Singapore) Straits Times] (6 May 2003, Accessed 20 March 2004) Available 
from www.psandman.com/articles/sars-3.htm, Internet, 1. 
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importantly they laid out the pros and cons of difficult decisions and looked to the 
population to guide decisions and make the best possible choices for themselves and their 
families.  According to the risk communications experts, “Singapore has occupied the 
middle ground between people’s fears on one side and tentative medical reassurance on 
the other.”37
In the end, it will be hard to determine conclusively the quantitative impact of the 
different international SARS risk communication strategies employed.  There are 
significant cultural, political and economic differences between Canada, Singapore and 
China even as they and 28 other countries addressed a common threat.38  A simple 
comparison of strategies is impossible to make.  Regardless of the reasons why 
information was restricted during the SARS outbreak, the fact remains that this limitation 
has a snowball effect by eroding public trust and promoting fearful reactions.  There are 
critical bio-terrorism response lessons to be learned in the SARS outbreak and the 
strategies employed to communicate risk to different audiences – the public, the media 
and the medical community.  In a bio-terrorism event in the United States, will a 
reviving, diffusely organized and generally untested public health system have the ability 
to rapidly create, coordinate and disseminate definitive, consistent and useful risk 
information for all segments of the American public?  In a country based on free speech 
and overlapping media markets, how does public health craft and deliver uniform, 
trustworthy and authoritative messages on diseases caused by an intentional release of a 
bio-weapon when a gap exists between the available scientific data and the public’s 
immediate need to know?  Effective risk communication planning is the most effective 
approach to resolving these questions. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Chapter II has examined the crucial role of risk communication planning in laying 
the groundwork for effective response to a bio-terrorism event.  As the goal of public 
health is to provide information to the public to help them understand the risks and 
potential losses or injuries, its most critical responsibility is planning how to rapidly 
 
37 Ibid. 
38 China Internet Information Center - China Through A Lens, Latest SARS Figures Worldwide –July 
11, 2003, [on-line] (Accessed 20 February 2004) Available from 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/SARS/62628.htm, Internet. 
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translate science in a fashion that helps the citizens take the appropriate actions.  This 
charge is particularly challenging for a system based on thorough research and data 
analysis.  Risk communication in a bio-terrorism event will involve translation of 
scientific information for a lay consumer, most likely while the technical information is 
still being discovered.  SARS provided an opportunity to examine different risk 
communication approaches to an unknown and deadly disease while the epidemiological 
investigation was underway.  It is useful to compare the benefits and deficits of these 
different international strategies when developing public health emergency response and 
risk communications plans within the United States.  There are also lessons learned from 
CDC and communities impacted by the terrorist attacks of 2001 that provide very 
valuable guidance for public health planning efforts nationwide.  In particular, these 
lessons point to the critical need to provide information rapidly and consistently even 
when the technical aspects are still in the making.  Effective risk communication will not 
only sustain, if not enhance, trust in the messenger but also reduce fear and injury and 
mitigate the social and economic impacts of the event on the community. 
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III.  COMMUNICATING RISK AND MANAGING FEAR: THE 
LEGACY OF THE ANTHRAX ATTACKS OF 2001 
Chapter II highlighted the importance of effective risk communication. This 
chapter examines how risk communication systems have evolved in the aftermath of the 
2001 Anthrax attacks on the United States and also analyzes the lessons learned from that 
response and from other recent public health emergencies that are applicable to state and 
local public health agencies. 
A. ANTHRAX AS A DEFINING EVENT IN THE EVOLUTION OF RISK 
COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES AND PLANNING 
Public health participation in bio-terrorism response has required many changes in 
its approach to disease investigation as well as its interaction with the public.  
Traditionally, public health has served a very specific role as a scientific interface in 
support of the medical community and as a direct service provider to groups in the 
community that were not served or underserved due to their lack of resources or special 
needs.  The change in mission not only created a movement away from meticulous 
research and analysis but also brought public health into partnership with law 
enforcement as well as into a direct advisory role to the community as a whole. 
The differences in investigation processes between public health and law 
enforcement as it applies to bio-terrorism came to light during the investigation of 
Anthrax in 2001.  The nature of public health requires investigation of bio-terrorism as a 
covert event.  The time and place when a disease makes its presence known is indistinct.  
A person becomes sick with a disease that may have resulted from an intentional act of 
bio-terrorism and the disease investigators or epidemiologists must trace the events 
occurring in that person’s life leading up to the onset of disease.  Law enforcement 
officers investigate bio-terrorism as an overt event that begins with a terrorist announcing 
a release of a biological agent or the detection of a crime scene which evolves as the 




                                                
Public health learned during the Anthrax response the necessity of maintaining a 
relationship with law enforcement if it was to communicate risks to the community. 
Confidentiality is maintained in public health investigations for the 
purpose of protecting sensitive patient medical information rather than 
national security. In law enforcement, confidentiality is also maintained to 
protect informants and witnesses and to preserve the integrity of the case 
for prosecution. Before 2001, most public health officials were not 
familiar with the principles of maintaining the chain of custody of 
specimens submitted for microbiologic testing so that laboratory results 
could be used for criminal prosecution…Partnership between public health 
and law enforcement is prerequisite to sound bio-terrorism planning and 
response… Each agency offers a unique perspective and opportunities to 
share information.39
Partnership between public health and law enforcement is a precondition to sound 
bio-terrorism planning and response.  Anthrax response in 2001 set the stage for 
collaboration between law enforcement and public health as both sought to investigate an 
unfamiliar event based on their own directives and provide information within their own 
mandates and limitations. 
 
39 Jay C. Butler, Mitchell L. Cohen, Cindy R. Friedman, Robert M. Scripp, and Craig G. Watz, 
“Collaboration Between Public Health and Law Enforcement: New Paradigms and Partnerships for Bio-
terrorism Planning and Response,” Emerging Infectious Diseases [serial online] (2002 October, Accessed 
31 May 2004) Available from: URL: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol8no10/02-0400.htm, Internet, 8. 
 
Figure 1.   Coordination Between Public Health and Law Enforcement in Overt and 
Covert Detection of Bio-Terrorism40 
 
In addition to learning how to communicate while working alongside law 
enforcement when “[c]ollaboration with law enforcement officials generally has not been 
recognized as beneficial or desirable in public health,” the public health system was also 
addressing its new role of communicating directly to the general public.41  Although 
public health agencies have been tasked with communicating risk directly to the nation in 
the recent homeland security crisis environment, this has not always been the case.   
Communicating the threat of disease to the public has not always been in 
the forefront of public health efforts.  Federal agencies have focused on 
scientific accuracy…(and) meticulously recorded the results of public  
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
41 Butler et al., 8. 
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health efforts in medical journals, reaching the public directly was, for the 
most part, left to the press and others who translated scientific journal 
information for the lay person.42
In spite of the best efforts of the CDC and public health communication workers 
to develop information quickly and accurately as events unfolded following the discovery 
of a purposeful release of Anthrax in 2001, this new approach would provide 
complications as well as many opportunities for learning.  This learning would prove 
beneficial during preparedness for the coming smallpox vaccination phase and other 
emergency communications processes such as occurrences of SARS, West Nile Virus 
and Monkeypox.  These lessons also provided the impetus for a refocusing of the future 
mission of public health. 
In March 2004, the CDC, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 
(ATSDR) and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) released a 
document known as A National Public Health Strategy for Terrorism Preparedness and 
Response 2003-2008.  In the introductory message from CDC Director Dr. Julie 
Gerberding she states that this document “exemplifies (their) leadership and captures 
(their) vision to protect people’s health from terrorist threats through a better prepared 
public health system.”43  The strategy stresses the need for the public health system to 
prepare for response and specifically highlights the critical role of communication in 
effective response: 
Crisis and emergency risk communications planning are necessary in 
order to reduce problems and confusion during an emergency.  Plans, 
policies, procedures and systems must not only be in place, but publicized 
across the organization to provide effective communication …not only 
within CDC/ATSDR, but with external groups, including partners, media 
and the public.44
This strategy sets public health agencies on the path to raise emergency preparedness and 
risk communication to the forefront of their organizational priorities.  The Anthrax events 
alerted public health agencies nationwide to the potential for bio-terrorism within their                                                  
42 V. Freimuth, H. W. Linnan and P. Potter, “Communicating the Threat of Emerging Infections to the 
Public” Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 6, Number 4 (July/August 2000): 337. 
43 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “A National Public Health Strategy for Terrorism 
Preparedness and Response 2003-2008” [on-line] (Accessed 20 May 2004) Available from 
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/planning/tprstrategy/pdf/FinalExternalStrategicPlan4-15-04.pdf, Preface. 
44 Ibid., 28. 
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communities and also provided an opportunity to collect valuable information on the 
specific challenges public health agencies are likely to be confront in an event.  
Ultimately, the Anthrax events confirmed the difficulty in communicating risk when 
scientific data is not available. 
Adding to the challenges imposed by an enhanced mission and new partners, one 
of the earliest lessons learned by public health during the Anthrax response was the need 
to change work systems in order to handle the quickly unfolding terrorist events.  
Although the CDC had a crisis management plan and staff skilled in risk communication, 
those plans were not developed with a response of this magnitude in mind.  CDC 
information routinely flowed through a rigorous review and clearance process to ensure 
the highest level of accuracy before it was released.  This thorough process did not 
account for the limited availability of validated scientific information, limited 
communication staff access to technical leads, nor the endless pressure to inform and 
explain a new public health threat.  Initially, the information developed was intended to 
target professional public health workers and the medical community and was often 
difficult for the media or the general public to understand. 
Within one week of the first indications of a bio-terrorist attack, CDC had 
retooled its communications processes and sent epidemiologists and communication 
teams to the impacted area.  As the event spread beyond Boca Raton, Florida to three 
other metropolitan areas (New York, New York, Washington, D.C., and 
Trenton/Princeton, New Jersey) the need for public health communication resources grew 
for response to an event that was clearly different from a naturally occurring Anthrax 
case.  With this leap into the realm of bio-terrorism response, public health entered the 
cycle of “science making – news making – news delivery.” CDC and public health 
agencies nationwide were confronted with the need to look at their preparedness plans 
and response resources as well as their processes for collecting, processing and delivering 
information.  
 
Figure 2.   CDC Communications Flow Early in the Anthrax Response45 
 
B. CRISIS COMMUNICATION LOGISTICS 
In order to develop a new way of meeting the demands for information on 
Anthrax, the CDC created communication teams and brought in the resources of the 
American Social Health Association (ASHA) to staff an information hotline.  CDC 
designated two teams to work shifts to cover the entire 24-hour news cycle and ensure the 
development of communication materials understandable by the public and the media.  
Each team was comprised of approximately 24 individuals.  The communications team 
developed Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) materials for the affected community, on-
site public health workers, postal and decontamination workers, and the lay public, as  
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well as web materials.  The FAQs were used as an information resource by the media 
team and the hotline staff while questions compiled by the media team and the hotline 
staff went back to the communication team to develop other FAQs.46
The Georgia Institute of Technology later did a study of the logistics involved in 
providing crisis and risk communications and identified key components that factored in 
to the struggles and successes of the process.  The researchers found that although the 
staff interviewed worked in several different areas and functions, common themes 
evolved on the strengths and challenges. 
Communicators saw a need to prepare for the real work of a large scale 
crisis…(including) the quick processing and delivery of new information 
generated by medical investigations.  Preparedness in the anthrax crisis 
played out in three arenas: assignment of space, the uses of technology, 
and the availability of pre-existing information on the topic of anthrax.47
From the beginning, the lack of co-located work space proved to be a difficulty in 
establishing a viable way to share information in a rapidly changing environment.  An 
emergency operations center (EOC) was created in CDC Headquarters.  The EOC 
workroom was divided into sections to bring together groups addressing issues related to 
specific sites where Anthrax events had occurred.  Unfortunately, the staff developing 
information for medical personnel was in a building adjacent to the EOC.  The staff 
working with the media was in yet another building.  The staff creating the 
communication tools had to walk between buildings to collect and compile information 
leading to a reduction in efficiency.  Information was available on naturally occurring 
Anthrax but little actual information was available on Anthrax when used as a bio-
weapon.  Assembling constantly changing data into meaningful information resources, 
when communication logistics were cumbersome and access to scientists was limited, 
became time consuming and inefficient. 
To the contrary of findings on CDC operations, the researchers looking at field 
response found communication efficiencies as communicators, scientists and state/local 
public health workers were co-located to facilitate the collection and compilation of 
 
46 Marsha Vanderford, PhD Telephone Interview by Susan Jones-Hard, Written Notes, 5 March 2004, 
Atlanta, Georgia and Denver, Colorado. 
47 Robinson and Newstetter, 21. 
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information.  Unfortunately, when not working from a designated location on-site, teams 
in the field were challenged by the lack of functional communication technology and up-
to-date contact information.  The researchers quote one communication responder as 
saying, “I had all this technology hanging off my waist and none of it was working, and 
everybody was fighting for six LAN lines…one fax machine, one little fax machine for 
ninety-nine health investigators.”48  As CDC’s primary means of communicating with the 
scientists investigating disease in the field is through electronic methods, technology 
limitations were a significant challenge. 
Since the end of the Anthrax phase the CDC has established an All –Hazards 
Emergency Communications System (ECS) to rectify some of the difficulties 
encountered during the response.  Twelve specifically selected communicators operate 
the core functions of the system.  These twelve staff members were selected because of 
their specific training and expertise in crisis and emergency communications, their 
familiarity with targeted audiences and their ability to translate and channel specific 
information to their target audience.  These key communicators are noted for their ability 
to work fast and their willingness to work long hours. 
The creation of the ECS was a viable solution to CDC internal inefficiencies and 
redundancies that became very clear during the Anthrax response.  Before the Anthrax 
response each functional component -or “center”-of CDC/ATSDR would launch its own 
independent communication function once that center had been assigned the technical 
lead for an emergency event.  There was a limited ability to share resources and, 
unfortunately, a new response approach was built for each new emergency response.  In 
order to allow the carry forward of lessons learned from Anthrax and all subsequent 
responses, as well as meet the communications needs of many types of communication 
audiences, the ECS was established.  The efficiency of the ECS also allowed the CDC to 
address the challenge of response to multiple events, while serving as a cross-cutting 
communication system as well.  Ten distinct teams were established within the ECS to 
create communication materials for targeted purposes.  The ten teams are: 
• Media  
• Public  
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• Clinicians  
• Research  
• Web Team  
• Public Response Hotline  
• Public Health Workforce  
• Leadership – designee from the appropriate CDC center office  
• Information Management - Coordination group that develops core 
messages and translations for audiences (literacy/language)  
• Policy Makers 
According to ECS Senior Medical Advisor Dr. Dan Baden, because of this new approach 
the CDC “now works more seamlessly with the centers and there is a good understanding 
of who to turn to for specific information.”49
Since it was established after the Anthrax crisis, the ECS has been used 
effectively to handle crisis response and risk communications during the West Nile Virus 
response, the Smallpox Vaccination initiative, as well as concerns related to SARS, 
Monkeypox, Hurricane Isabel, the Eastern and Northwestern power outages, BioWatch 
positives, flu vaccine shortages and the Washington D.C. ricin event.  Dr. Marsha 
Vanderford, Acting Associate Director of the CDC Office of Communications, states that 
“(the Emergency Communications System) has been absolutely beneficial.”50
Jana Telfer, the CDC Media Relations lead during the Anthrax response, confirms 
the value of this coordinated system.  During the Anthrax response the media relations 
function was staffed seven days a week with 12 person teams.  She states now they use 
two sequential teams, but during Anthrax there was not room for two teams working at 
the same time.  Surge capacity was no more than people working longer hours and 
completing a higher volume of work.51
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In addition to the coordinated communication teams, the CDC’s interaction with 
the media has changed.  During Anthrax, as with all other previous public health 
emergencies, media were not allowed on the CDC campus.  CDC tele-briefings provided 
the media access to technical experts by phone but there were no opportunities for 
television media to broadcast live footage.  All follow-up response to the media was one-
on-one creating the potential for message disparity.  Telfer states that because of lessons 
learned during Anthrax response: 
TV was allowed on campus for SARS.  This was the first time for TV to 
be present for breaking news and they were able to capture the information 
as it was said.  TV added reach and has made a difference for the public.52
C. MAINTAINING PUBLIC TRUST 
1. Communication, Coordination, Consistency and Value 
Because the technical aspects of investigating Anthrax as a bio-weapon were 
underway while news releases were being developed, the goal of the CDC was to get the 
most current information out early and maintain the trust of the public.  This was 
particularly challenging as there is no system within the United States that ensures 
coordination of health functions across public and private sectors and across levels of 
government.  The CDC was intent on coordinating risk communication with local 
partners in Florida, Washington, D.C., New York, and New Jersey but there was no 
natural process at that time to facilitate this coordination.  According to Dr. David A. 
Shore of the Harvard University School of Public Health,  
The United States does not have a health care system.  Rather, we operate 
as a health care industry, a constellation of unrelated and often fragmented 
enterprises performing independent functions, often with different (if not 
competing) objectives.53
The challenge for the federal government during the Anthrax response was to 
determine the nature of the disease as a weapon, communicate this information to the 
media and the public and try to facilitate a coordinated message from the local 
community.  While the CDC had to focus on global impacts, local public health 
communicators were faced with the conundrum of addressing those global impacts as 
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they translated them in the context of local social and cultural issues.  Although 
potentially exposed citizens in Florida and at the NBC offices in New York City were 
treated with Ciprofloxacin, the CDC recommended that local health department provide 
Doxycycline as a prophylaxis regimen for postal workers in Brentwood, New Jersey.  
Although the change in the CDC recommendation was based on findings that 
Doxycycline was equally effective with fewer negative side effects, postal workers 
interpreted the switch to a less expensive drug as an indication of a lower priority in 
standard of care and -because of the differences in demographics -potential evidence of 
racial bias.  In order to address this concern, C.A. Walks, the Director of the Washington 
D.C. Health Department communicated the basis of this change in a presentation before 
the National Medical Association representing 25,000 African-American doctors across 
the nation.  “With things like this, the first thing we should do is make sure that we’re 
going to get the same medical treatment as everyone else.”54
During the Anthrax phase, the process of translating science to recommendations 
for the public entailed challenges beyond the crafting of the messages and coordinating 
delivery with state and local health agencies.  As the previous CDC communication target 
had been the professional health and medical community, no attention had been focused 
on ensuring that the communication tools were commensurate with the literacy standards 
of the general public.  Study of how the public health messages directly impacted public 
understanding of the risks and their subsequent behavioral and emotional response was 
not the top priority.  During a public health emergency it is critical that all those impacted 
by the event understand the nature of the emergency and take the appropriate steps to 
mitigate the impact and reduce fear.  As noted in a report by three authors representing 
three aspects of the communication process – public health, the medical community and 
education - “Communication is also needed to dispel myths, to reduce fears, and, in times 
of crisis, to alert the public and provide directions for urgent action.”55  The authors 
found in a review of previous research that most health information documents were 
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tailored to a professional audience and far exceeded the reading level of the general 
public.  They note that findings in education and economics analysis confirm that “the 
average adult does not have the literacy skills required for tasks in the twenty-first 
century workplace or for full participation in the activities of everyday civic life.”56  That 
being said, the challenge of communicating the risks associated with Anthrax to the 
general public in terms that they understand, that reduce their fear and upon which they 
will act appropriately is daunting. 
During the Anthrax Crisis, it was even difficult to deliver key messages to the 
American media.  On 7 October 2001, the first press release was made discussing the 
discovery of a positive nasal swab taken from a worker at The Sun (the impacted Florida 
media outlet) suggesting exposure.  Although CDC considered an exposure as simply that 
– that the individual has been exposed to the agent –the media and public began viewing 
“exposure” as having the disease.  Dr. Marsha Vanderford acknowledged the difficulty 
clarifying this confusion in saying: 
It was hard to explain the presence of a hazard is not the same as an 
infection.  (It was difficult to explain that) finding the presence in the air is 
not the same as getting sick.57
Explaining lab results was also difficult.  Neither the media nor the public 
understood that finding a positive on one test and then a negative on another test did not 
mean that the first was an indicator nor that it was definitively right or wrong – just a 
difference in time and place.  It was hard to completely explain to the public why public 
health officials would not just accept the first test as definitive and act upon it. 
Regardless of the challenges and complication of response, there was consensus 
on the operational priority. All three CDC communication leaders interviewed for this 
thesis agreed that getting out the word quickly is the most critical aspect in a successful 
response.  Dr. Dan Baden, CDC Senior Medical Advisor in the Office of 
Communications, remarked that the most significant lesson learned during the Anthrax  
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response was, “Have one consistent message, get it out rapidly and be accurate.”58  
However, Acting Media Relations Director Jana Telfer acknowledged, “Getting the 
message out early is antithetical to scientific investigation.”59
Unfortunately, even when public health was successful in getting the information 
out quickly the process of interpreting technical aspects for the lay public was a challenge 
for the duration of the Anthrax response.  The ultimate goal of providing information was 
to reduce community fear of this bio-weapon and to compel citizens to act appropriately 
to protect themselves.  However, the success in delivering the message is also tied to the 
ability of the messenger to deliver it.  J. Gregory Payne, the Director of Ethics in Political 
and Health Communication at Emerson College, and Skye K. Schulte, Director of Lead 
Action at Tufts University, note that mass media and public health priorities have a 
strong influence on the actions taken by the public but that, “even with pledges for ethical 
dissemination of information, disconnects often exist between the source of the 
information and those receiving the message.”60
The CDC and state and local counterparts were compelled to try repeatedly to 
explain that the swabs simply lead to an estimation of risk not the likelihood of disease.  
Public health officials would then need to explain that a series of things happen when 
they suspect something has occurred and that the swabs are just one in a series of tests 
used to arrive at the most accurate findings.  In spite of repeatedly stating that the swabs 
were taken as a means of collecting other forms of information for integration into the 
study of the process, it was not until October 28 (three weeks later) that the first story was 
published in the Washington Post stating that public health officials were no longer 
taking nasal swabs because the information was “misleading” as an indicator of potential 
illness.  When reporters had difficulty understanding and interpreting the information on 
the nasal swabs, it is not surprising that fearful patients began turning to physicians and 
public health officials for nasal swabs to rule out exposure and, potentially, the disease  
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itself.  Unfortunately, further confounding a confusing and fearful situation, some 
physicians in Florida would not see patients and referred them back to the local health 
department, placing additional burden on an already taxed agency.61
2. Maintaining Public Trust 
Once the information is translated accurately, the next step that public health must 
consider for successful communication is determining whether the risk communication 
information will induce the public to take the appropriate steps to address the risk and 
reduce fear.   
Risk communications expert Dr. Vincent Covello notes the critical role of public 
trust in effective risk communication when the threat is unfamiliar, or when the risk 
associated with the threat is exotic, direct, involuntary, or of human origin. 
Only when trust has been established can other goals, such as education 
and consensus building be achieved.  Trust can only be built over time and 
is the result of ongoing actions, listening and communication skill.62
In a recent survey to determine confidence in federal agencies following the 
harrowing terrorism events of 2001, the Gallup Organization found that the public placed 
CDC at the top of the list of agencies trusted.63  Although the survey does not elucidate 
the reasons for this high level of regard, it does note that the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) was also rated highly while the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) received the lowest score.  There appears to be a logical progression from these 
statistics indicating that the agencies identified favorably were perceived to be providing 
intelligence on the terrorism events and protective services to the public compelling the 
public to bestow upon them a higher level of trust.  EPA, an agency very actively 
involved in the recovery phase of both events, was not in a position to provide 
information and protective recommendations to the public and was likely rated lower as a 
result. 
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Public health seems to naturally receive the benefit of public trust provided the 
important risk information is provided effectively.  In an article aptly titled “What Really 
Scares Us,” risk communications author David Ropiek compares perceptions of risk 
based on different sources of information. 
We trust certain sources more than others.  We’re less afraid when a 
trusted doctor or scientist, such as the head of the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, explains anthrax than when a politician explains 
it…the more complicated a risk is, the less we can understand it – and the 
more we treat it like a snake, just to be safe.64
The lesson for public health is that the ability to collect information in a bio-terrorism 
event is just the first challenge in its response.  Only by providing continual updates of 
known information while acknowledging what is not known will public health lay the 
groundwork of trust essential to the process of communicating risk  
3. Communicating Risk and Reducing Fear 
Regardless of the actual damages that result, by definition an act of terrorism is 
intended to create terror in the population.  Terrorism researcher Bruce Hoffman notes 
that, “Terrorism…is deliberately conceived to have far-reaching psychological 
repercussions beyond the actual target of the act among a wider, watching ‘target’ 
audience.”65  Terrorism events will always be of human origin and have a direct and 
involuntary impact on the immediate community, the nation, and throughout the world.  
In spite of the familiarity with terrorism events world-wide, the United States has 
historically been spared the constant attacks encountered in areas such as Israel.  As a 
result, any terrorism event on U.S. soil– even those using common explosives – will be 
unfamiliar and exotic and will require agencies to communicate risk. 
All public health agencies must ensure that they are prepared to communicate risk 
to their community following a bio-terrorism event whether or not they are directly 
impacted.  Prior to the terrorism events of 2001, public agencies did not have the 
resources or any implied responsibility to demonstrate that they had information available 
on terrorist weapons (including biological agents) health impacts, or recovery 
recommendations.  Most did not, and likely still do not, have the material and human 
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resources to immediately and effectively launch and maintain a risk communication 
function.  Many agencies will be challenged by the resource requirements of simply 
investigating a significant outbreak and communicating the impacts locally.  CDC and 
the Anthrax impacted areas learned early on that a terrorist attack will require tremendous 
assets, skills and response capabilities.  A concerted planning process will ensure that all 
resources are addressed.  However, an emergency response plan that does not go the next 
step and address how the public health agency will communicate disease information and 
protective actions back to the community sets the stage for a loss of trust and credibility.  
With the loss of trust and credibility the ability to translate the risk and compel the 
community to take the appropriate steps is hampered from the onset. 
Public health agencies, post-2001, must plan how they will communicate risk in 
tandem with a law enforcement investigation as well as political oversight that will 
naturally occur simultaneously.  Timothy O’Connor, Public Information Director of the 
Palm Beach County Health Department, developed a paper called “Managing Media and 
Other Mass Communication during a Bio-terrorist Incident” which outlines the 
complexities of handling an event in conjunction with these two components.  In his 
paper, O’Connor discusses the early stages of establishing the credibility and trust 
immediately when “what affects your community can have an effect on the world.”66  
This paper details their process of identifying a credible and knowledgeable spokesperson 
(Dr. Jean Malecki, Palm Beach County Health Department Director, served in that 
capacity) and creating a good rapport and trust with the media and key stakeholders in the 
community, including the impacted business and the postal workers.  This process was 
working effectively, even as up to 100 calls were coming in to this local health agency 
each hour, until the Florida Governor’s Office advised the agency to cancel all news 
briefings on October 9 (Day 6) because there was “no new news and the issue had 
become a matter of national security.”  This was further exacerbated on October 10 when 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Justice Department issued a “stop order” on 
the health department news conference 30 minutes before it was scheduled to begin.  The 
FBI then announced they would hold a press conference themselves at an unknown  
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location four hours later.  The lesson learned noted by O’Connor was: “a sudden and 
uncertain shift in events creates public distrust, can imply a major breakthrough…and can 
lead to false implications.”67
In order to better understand the impact of these shifts on this intricate 
communication process, it is important to define risk.  Dr. Vincent Covello defines risk as 
“the probability of loss of that which we value.”68  Because the threat directly impacts 
important aspects of our lives and, frequently, the most basic human need for safety and 
security, additional care must be taken to accommodate the sensitivity of those impacted 
to the way the message is developed and delivered.  Through decades of behavioral 
science research, Covello concludes that 50% of the impact a risk communication 
message has is based on the ability of the communicator to demonstrate caring and 
empathy for the victims.  In equal measures, competence and expertise on the subject 
matter, honesty and openness on communicating what is known about the hazard and the 
demonstrated commitment and dedication to address the threat are also critical.69
In a bio-terrorism event, it is critical that all public officials collaborate across 
disciplines and at all levels to ensure the delivery of consistent messages.  Specifically, 
public health officials at all levels will be called upon to translate the risk in such a way 
that it will cause the impacted community to take the appropriate steps to reduce the risk.  
If these officials are routinely visible in communicating health risks in this community 
and have first established credibility through professional competence and expertise, they 
have laid the groundwork for communicating risk in uncertain, high stress, low trust 
situations.  These local officials can potentially have a very strong impact on influencing 
behavior.  However, if these officials have not practiced delivering these risk messages 
when they themselves have limited information and are stressed and frustrated, they run 
the risk of overshadowing the most critical component of risk communication – caring 
and empathy.  If the impacted audience perceives that information is being withheld, the  
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ability of the community to identify those officials as credible and trustworthy is highly 
unlikely.  When the source of the message is deemed to lack credibility, it is not likely 
that the audience will act upon the guidance provided. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Key Elements in Trust and Credibility70 
 
Beyond the fact that the community will not accept messages delivered by a 
communicator they do not trust or believe, public health officials attempting to 
communicate following a bio-terrorism event will be challenged by the public responding 
out of panic or fear.  Unlike naturally occurring disasters where there is an understanding 
of why or how the event took place, identifiable points of onset, and a general 
understanding of how events will unfold, it may never be known how or why a bio-
terrorism event occurred.  After the September 11 attacks on New York City and 
Washington D.C. communities nationwide pulled together out of shock and horror.  In a 
bio-terrorism event, where the vehicle of terror is a disease, it is difficult to project 
whether a community will respond in the same cooperative manner or be pulled even 
farther apart.  In most disaster situations, there is not a great likelihood that citizens will 
panic.  However, during the Anthrax events there was evidence that citizens were getting 
prescriptions for Ciprofloxacin even when there was no indication that they had been or 
would be exposed to the agent.  As the nation recovered from the attacks, government 
officials provided guidance to people on how to take protective actions – such as being 
prepared to seal their homes with plastic and duct tape - and businesses preyed on the 
vulnerability of a frightened nation. 




                                                
CDC Media Relations Director Jana Telfer acknowledged the difficulty for 
scientists to communicate risk in such a way that the public perceives that they and the 
communicator share the trauma.  Telfer explains that the most critical skill for public 
health agencies is: 
…Understanding what effective risk communication entails. There is an 
inherent difference between scientific interest and public concerns.  
Scientists have to acknowledge the human situation.  It lets people know 
you have an understanding of their situation…Scientists must say what 
they know, what they do not know and how they are going to address the 
gaps.…Government officials are hesitant to talk about the gaps because it 
may be perceived as not doing their jobs.71  
Dr. Peter Sandman’s research on risk communication also indicates that it is critical that 
public health agencies understand, anticipate and be prepared to address the fear as well 
as the element of public outrage associated with a terrorist attack.  Looking at elements of 
motivation in recovery from a bio-terrorism event it is important to note that this exotic 
and intentional threat undermines the most basic life processes.  Abraham Maslow’s 
Hierarchy of Needs (first proposed in 1954,) identifies that a person must meet their 
physiological needs as well as ensure they are safe and secure before they will have the 
motivation to seek a sense of belonging.72  This community spirit proved critical in the 
response to the World Trade Center and Pentagon attack and will also be vital in 
responding to and recovering from a bio-terrorism event and must also be considered 
during the risk communication process.  Public health must be able to communicate with 
the public in such a way that they will be empowered to protect themselves physically, 
feel that they are safe and secure and move toward recovery.  Public outrage is a natural 
response of a community impacted by a catastrophic event, particularly if the event 
occurred because of hostile intent or a transgression of normal standards of morality.  
Outrage must also be addressed in the public health risk communication planning 
processes.  Risk communication researchers have identified 20 significant outrage 
factors.  They note that as more of these factors are present it is even more difficult to 
communicate risk, producing a greater likelihood that mistrust, anger and fear will result.  
In order to address this element, researchers advise that risk communicators work to 
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neutralize public outrage by: finding out what the community wants to know; responding 
to all requests for information; acknowledging uncertainty; admitting that risk exists; and, 
releasing information early.73
In order to think far enough ahead to effectively collect the resources and hone the 
skills necessary to reduce fear and public outrage in a bio-terrorism event, risk 
communication planning is essential.  There are many ways to approach risk 
communication.  Public health agencies should select one approach that works best 
within their organization or community.  Risk communication planning has become a 
standard business function within corporations cognizant that their products could lead to 
death or injury.  This is particularly true after many high profile risk communications 
events such as the Tylenol product tampering deaths in 1982 and the Exxon Valdez oil 
spill in 1989.74
Although poor risk communication in government agencies does not impact a 
financial bottom line as it does in private industry, there is an equally detrimental impact 
to credibility and public trust if public health is not able to effectively deliver key 
messages.  Although there are various ways to prepare for communicating risk, the 
commonality in the methods is the need for a plan.  The most critical aspects of the plan 
are: 1) establishing communication goals; 2) identifying the various audiences to be 
reached; 3) developing valuable messages; 4) choosing the best media for the different 
messages; 5) identifying credible spokespersons and information sources; and 6) 
developing contingency plans for communication breakdowns.75
The health department in New York City is testimony to the fact that effective 
communication planning is just as important as communication skill.  In spite of the 
availability of staff skilled in communicating risk and even experienced with large impact 
events, such as West Nile Virus, they were greatly challenged when confronted with a 
response to the impact of the World Trade Center attacks as well as Anthrax.  After 9/11 
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the agency changed its approach to communications.  It began developing plans complete 
with emergency scenarios and messages crafted beforehand.  They also established 
systems that make the best use of their communication staff in a crisis.  Sandra Mullin, 
the Director of Communications and Associate Commissioner of the NYC Department of 
Health and Mental Hygiene, wrote: 
Until recently, we had not written down a systematic plan of all the actions 
a crisis warrants.  Time and staff deficits made the tasks of thinking 
through a series of contingent possibilities and associated actions a 
backburner need.  Not so now…we learned through the crisis of 9/11 that 
not having protocols written down of what to do, what our likely messages 
are, and who to contact seriously slows down and hampers internal and 
external communication.76
There is no doubt that any health agency in the nation would be challenged by 
events of the magnitude of the attacks on the World Trade Center.  However, if an 
organization that routinely deals with fast-paced media and addresses the needs of a city 
of over eight million people is extraordinarily challenged in an extreme crisis, less 
practiced organizations will be challenged in communicating risk following a bio-terrorist 
act.  Without an effective risk communication process guided by a concerted planning 
function it is unlikely that the public health agency will be effective in reducing fear. 
4. Communicating Risk to Promote Effective Action 
Ultimately, the public health goal of communicating risk in a bio-terrorism event 
is to inform the public in such a way that they will listen to the spokesperson they trust 
delivering a message that they can understand and upon which they will act to protect 
themselves, their family,  and their community.  In order to determine the best person to 
deliver the most valuable messages in the manner most effective for causing the desired 
behavior, the CDC and other public health researchers are examining the role of opinion 
surveys.  By surveying how the public responds based on the messages they receive, 
public health could work to develop messages that promote specific behaviors.  This is 
not the standard process of public health communication.  Ironically, the Department of 
Health and Human Services sponsored HIV/AIDS surveys between 1987 and 1995 but 
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this significant survey process began years after the epidemic began.77  By the time the 
survey process ended, opportunities to change the message to enhance the desired 
behavior change had already been missed. 
CDC’s William Pollard also undertook a review of six national surveys of the 
public’s perception before and after the bio-terrorism events of 2001.  He examined 
surveys of assorted groups – the media, health officials and the general public – to better 
understand how health information is gathered and processed for behavior change.  
Pollard found that both before and after the Anthrax events most people looked to the 
media for information.  Pollard also found that the number of people who gathered 
information from public health dropped during the Anthrax response while the interest in 
collecting information from personal physicians increased.78  Another survey, on the 
other hand, demonstrated that the local health department was the most trusted source of 
information.79  These surveys would indicate a possible disconnect between the public’s 
interest in receiving risk information from the local health agency as a trusted entity and 
lack of ready access to the local health agency as an information resource.  As actions are 
most likely to take place after communication from a credible and trusted source, state 
and local health departments play critical roles in communicating risk leading to the 
recommended action. 
If the goal of collecting data is to confirm or adjust approaches to a problem, 
retrospective opinion polling is of significantly less value than opinions in the midst of 
the crisis.  Media reports provide valuable information on public perceptions but do not 
hold the same value as sponsored data collection using scientific methods and controls.  
In “Using Opinion Surveys to Track the Public’s Response to a Bio-terrorist Attack,” the 
authors stress the need for short duration rapid turnaround surveys to help public health 
craft messages leading to appropriate behavior change.  In their article, the authors 
comment that “epidemics, biological attacks, and battlefield conditions are all similar to 
 
77 Robert Blendon, J. M. Benson, C. M. Desroches, and K. J. Weldon, “Using Opinion Surveys to 
Track the Public’s Response to a Bioterrorist Act,” Journal of Health Communications, Vol. 8 Supplement 
1 (2003): 83. 
78 William E. Pollard, “Public Perceptions of Information Sources Concerning Bio-Terrorism before 
and After Anthrax Attacks: An Analysis of National Survey Data,” Journal of Health Communications, 
Vol. 8 Supplement 1 (2003): 97. 
79 Ibid., 100. 
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political campaigns in that specific events can change the behavior and beliefs of many 
people in a short time, often a period of a few days.”80  This perspective confirms that 
constant assessment of public opinion will enable public health to develop messages that 
influence individual behavior leading to protective actions of the community. 
In an effort to assess the value of developing communication tools based on 
survey findings, the Harvard School of Public Health/Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 
Survey Project on American’s Response to Biological Terrorism undertook a series of 
telephone surveys between October 24 and 28, 2001. In this survey, the foundation was 
able to determine which actions the surveyed public was taking to address their concerns 
about Anthrax.  In a very short amount of time they were able to assess the impact these 
actions were having on the public health and medical communities. They were also able 
to uncover confusing issues and misperception.  However, at this point there is no 
national planning structure in place that would allow message development to take place 
based on the concerns identified. 
If this data collection process was a common practice in public health 
communications, officials at all levels could create uniform messages as well as correct 
or redirect messaging in order to maximize the impact as well as get a more accurate 
perception of the needs of the community beyond the most vocal population.  Dr. Marsha 
Vanderford of the CDC Office of Communications stated that they are now working with 
Dr. Robert Blendon of the Harvard Program on Public Opinion and Health and Social 
Policy to incorporate opinion polling in public health risk communication messages.  It 
was used effectively for mad cow and influenza.  The polling was used to identify public 
misconceptions and their interest in details of where the event falls on the continuum of 
risk.  However, she stops short of stating the CDC is ready to use polling to craft 
messages during a crisis. 
(Since) Anthrax, public polling has been used to determine if there is a 
misconception.  We don’t use it specifically to determine which way a message 




80 Pollard, 84. 
81 Marsha Vanderford Interview.  
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D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Understanding the factors that facilitate or derail effective risk communication 
processes in public health is critical for maintaining trust and reducing fear following a 
bio-terrorism event.  In this chapter we have addressed the need to identify effective 
credible and trustworthy spokespersons capable of delivering a message at the 
appropriate literacy level for it to be useful in affecting behavior to protect individuals 
and the community.  This chapter has identified factors that influence trust as well as 
ways to craft messages that will lead to a useful link between the messenger, the 
message, and the needs of the community following a bio-terrorism event.  The key 
factor that will facilitate a strong connection between all aspects necessary to 
communicate risk is the efficacy of the planning structures that must be intact and 
practiced to support a communication response of the magnitude of a bio-terrorism event. 
This chapter has also expanded on the logistical support components that are 
critical to establishing and maintaining a public health response to a bio-terrorism event.  
Without preplanning for staffing, facilities, equipment, resource materials and 
communication systems necessary during response it is highly unlikely that those 
resources will be available when the response gets underway.  Three organizations with 
experience and resources – the CDC, Palm Beach County Health Department, and the 
New York City Health Department – found themselves challenged when faced with this 
nation’s first response to bio-terrorism.  Anthrax injured only 22 people in the country – 
five of which died – but it was responsible for “forever changing the realm of public 
health.”82  The challenges posed by a response to this limited event will grow 
exponentially when casualties mount into the hundreds or thousands.  Both Anthrax and 
SARS provided an important opportunity to review the difficulties in addressing an 
outbreak of unknown origin and etiology.  The conundrum of unraveling the science in 
the midst of informing the public of the associated risk cannot be ignored.
 
82 James M. Hughes and Julie Louis Gerberding, Anthrax Bio-Terrorism: Lessons Learned and Future 
Directions [on-line] (Accessed 30 May 2004) Available from 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol8no10/02-0466.htm, Internet. 
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IV. THE GROUND TRUTH: A SURVEY OF CURRENT RISK 
COMMUNICATION PLANNING  
To determine the extent to which state public health agencies are actually drawing 
upon lessons learned from Anthrax and other recent events, and capitalizing upon the 
emerging best practices at the federal level and analysis in the academic literature, I 
conducted a survey of officials in eleven states in the region around Colorado on risk 
communication planning.  This chapter summarizes 1) the specific objectives of the 
survey; 2) its structure and composition; and 3) key findings.  The chapter concludes by 
comparing the survey results with lessons learned from the 2001 Anthrax incidents by the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and public health officials in Palm Beach, 
Florida, where the Anthrax was first detected. 
A. SURVEY OBJECTIVES 
My survey was intended to illuminate the relationship between the risk 
communication planning and preparedness efforts, and to assess the ability of the public 
health system, through effective risk communication, to maintain public trust and reduce 
fear following an actual or potential act of terrorism.  The desired outcome of the survey 
was a projection of the potential for a successful response to a crisis event that requires 
public health to respond, communicate risks associated with a bio-terrorism threat and 
influence the public to take appropriate actions to protect themselves and their 
community.  As one rarely has the opportunity for pre-event/post-event research in 
emergency situations, conclusions must be drawn from involvement in and perceived 
success with other related events – in this case, state response to Anthrax events and, to a 
lesser degree, the smallpox vaccination initiative.  The survey region was selected to 
include all states within the Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) Region VIII as well as all states bordering the State of 
Colorado serving as a central focal point for the purposes of this research.  As bio-
terrorism events do not recognize political boundaries, the goal of this survey is to 
determine the level of regional planning as it relates to the potential for successful 
outcomes in a public health risk communication process.  Data on the timing of the 
integration of bio-terrorism oriented risk communication efforts to the increased 
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availability of funding will also be used to predict the impact of future public health 
emergency preparedness funding reductions should that occur.   
B. PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING: SURVEY 
ELEMENTS 
The survey that serves as the centerpiece of this thesis was sent to public health 
leaders in eleven states to help address two critical questions:  
• how important is emergency planning to the successful resolution of a 
public health crisis, particularly crises involving a bio-terrorism agent; 
and,  
• does risk communication planning lead to a more successful community 
response during a public health emergency?   
This survey seeks to answer these questions by examining numerous related 
dynamics in this process that should contribute to risk communication outcomes .  
Factors addressed within the survey include: 
• The presence of emergency planning efforts within the surveyed agency; 
• The point in time when the agency became actively engaged in crisis 
oriented risk communication and their reported level of experience with 
public health risk communication; 
• The complexity of the agency’s emergency planning process as 
exemplified by the types of threats the agency’s emergency plan 
addresses;   
• The level of use of emergency planning tools within the agency as 
demonstrated by revision and exercising of the plan as a measure of 
planning process quality; 
• The level of risk communication planning as implied by the thoroughness 
of the risk communication plan itself; and, 
• The commitment of the agency to a planned risk communication process 
as indicated by the timing during which the agency designated or hired a 
risk communication specialist or lead. 
These factors were selected in order to connect preparedness planning efforts to 
organizational commitment and perceived successes in communicating risk.  The original 
hypothesis of this thesis was that organizations which started planning earlier, spent more 
time on the development of their emergency plan, developed risk communications plans 
and identified staff to lead the effort would report a higher level of preparedness and  
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success.  As the survey results will show, this hypothesis did not hold.  To the contrary, 
by these measures the potential for success was marginal while confidence in past and 
future success was high. 
This thesis examines the presence and quality of the public health risk 
communication planning efforts within an eleven state survey region.  As the person 
responsible for the public health bio-terrorism preparedness efforts for the State of 
Colorado, I selected this specific survey region to ascertain the level of preparedness 
activities within our shared Homeland Security/FEMA region.  I was particularly 
interested in examining preparedness levels in adjoining states which have a direct impact 
on shared resources and media markets in frontier (reduced access, resources and low 
population) communities on our shared borders. 
C. ROCKY MOUNTAIN WEST PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS 
As previously identified, it is the responsibility of public health agencies to 
prepare to respond to a biological terrorism event.  The threat has been identified and 
federal dollars made available to undertake necessary steps to protect the public from a 
bio-terrorism event. Since 2002, $260,812,00383,84 has been provided to a grouping of 
state health departments, referred to in this paper as the Rocky Mountain West. 
I artificially devised this grouping to collect data on the Department of Homeland 
Security/FEMA Region VIII states as well as all states bordering Colorado as part of my 
professional responsibility for public health preparedness activities in Colorado.  It was 
my hypothesis that significant planning efforts were underway in the included states since 
the influx of nationwide public health bio-terrorism funding after 2001.  As most of the 
states in the survey area have a relatively low population, at least compared to coastal 
states, they had received minimal benefit from the early phases of national counter-
terrorism funding.  I sought to ascertain when emergency planning efforts began within  
 
83 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Bio-Terrorism Funding by State-City-Territory for 
Fiscal Year 2002 [report on-line] (Accessed 4 May 2004) Available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2003pres/20030902.html, Internet. 
84 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Continuation Guidance for Cooperative Agreement on 
Public Health Preparedness and Response for Bio-Terrorism – Budget Year Four,[guidance document on-
line] (Accessed 4 May 2004) Available from 
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/planning/continuationguidance/pdf/annex_b_funding.pdf, Internet. 
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each state’s public health agency, how those emergency plans came into play, the role of 
risk communication planning in the agency’s emergency planning efforts and their 
perceived level of preparedness as well as success in communicating risk. 
Beyond the hypothesis that active planning was underway, I also proposed that the 
agencies that demonstrated the most significant planning efforts and had the most highly 
developed risk communication plans would report the highest level of confidence in their 
preparedness and level of success in responding and communicating risk in an event 
involving bio-terrorism.  September 11 was selected as a primary delineation date as the 
terrorism mission and priority for many agencies changed then.  Terrorism was no longer 
simply a concern for other nations.  The activities related to Anthrax response 
(particularly planning initiatives) were selected as a critical event for this survey as they 
represented the first bio-terrorism event in America with nationwide implications.  State 
public health agencies should have understood while they watched federal as well as 
other state and local public health agencies investigate and respond to actual Anthrax 
events and hoaxes the potential of bio-terrorism response in their community and the 
complexity of communicating risk within scientific limitations. 
The smallpox vaccination phase was also studied to determine whether lessons 
learned and resources developed during the Anthrax phase proved beneficial during these 
bio-terrorism related proceedings.  However, as the smallpox communication target was 
the medical community rather than the lay public, this avenue proved to be of minimal 
research benefit. 
Finally, I investigated when each state had identified a risk communication lead 
as an indication of the priority of this function in the planning efforts.  Unfortunately, as 
no question was posed in the survey to determine whether this was the person’s primary 
position or role and the professional/educational background of the individual selected as 
the risk communication lead, prioritization and continuity of the function could not be 
conclusively determined. 
As part of this grouping, the bio-terrorism grant leaders in the health agencies of 
the following states were mailed a 20 question survey in January 2004 that allowed them  
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to select answers indicating when different planning events were undertaken as well as 
how in-depth the planning process was.  They were also asked questions allowing them 
to rate their resulting level of preparedness and success.  
 
Region VIII States Border States 
Colorado Arizona 
Montana Kansas 
North Dakota Nebraska 
South Dakota New Mexico 
Utah Oklahoma 
Wyoming  
Table 1. Rocky Mountain West States 
 
As we can only assume that a state public health agency is prepared to respond to 
a biological event based on their available resources (staff) and expertise (plans, events 
and exercises) this survey targeted those two factors.  While there are many elements that 
will influence the ability of a state health agency to respond effectively to a bio-terrorism 
event, I chose to focus exclusively on the agency’s preparation and perceived skill at 
communicating risk to the public.  In short, regardless of the operations taking place to 
investigate and treat those impacted by an event, it will be the ability of the agency to 
translate those operations to the public in a meaningful way that will determine success. 
The survey looks specifically at the preparedness activities before September 11, 
2001, after the attacks and during the time of concern about “mystery powders” and 
Anthrax exposure, and during the smallpox vaccination phase.  These three segments in 
time also mirror changes in federal funding levels and public awareness and concern.  As 
most states are completely reliant on federal funding for this type of activity, an agency 
that simply undertakes required preparedness activities at a point when funding is 
available is unlikely to maintain the function should the funding be reduced or 
eliminated. Of most significance is the relationship of the level of knowledge of a 
respondent about their state’s preparedness activities and their perception of success and 
preparedness in this arena. 
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Specifically, the preparedness elements addressed within the survey are: 
• The presence of emergency planning efforts within the surveyed agency; 
• The point in time when the agency became actively engaged in crisis 
oriented risk communication and theoretical level of experience with 
public health risk communication; 
• The complexity of the agency’s emergency planning process as 
exemplified by the types of threats the agency’s emergency plan 
addresses;   
• The level of use of emergency planning tools within the agency as 
demonstrated by revision and exercises of the plan as a measure of 
planning process quality; 
• The level of risk communication planning as implied by the thoroughness 
of the risk communication plan itself; and, 
• The commitment of the agency to a planned risk communication process 
as indicated by the timing during which the agency designated or hired a 
risk communication specialist or lead. 
D. SURVEY METHODOLOGY 
The survey questionnaire was developed with the intention of keeping it simple 
enough that a respondent need only commit five minutes to circle answers and provide 
the necessary data.  Whenever possible, respondents were asked to skip questions that 
were not applicable based on earlier answers.  This attempt to reduce the time needed to 
complete the survey created some confusion as some respondents answered the related 
questions anyway or subsequently answered negatively to questions previously answered 
affirmatively.  This dissonance was accommodated by choosing the answer that matched 
other associated questions in the survey.  Items with specific disconnects are noted in the 
footnotes.  A copy of the survey is included as Appendix A. 
Prior to the survey being mailed, my staff in the Colorado Department of Public 
Health and Environment (CDPHE) Emergency Management Program/Focus Area A, as 
part of ongoing planning activities, had contacted each state health agency by phone to 
update our list of actual names and addresses of individuals in leadership roles under the 
Department of Health and Human Services/CDC bio-terrorism cooperative agreement 
grant or under the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) grant for  
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hospitals.  This planning matrix was used as the basis for the survey undertaken for this 
thesis.  The grants are broken into seven topic categories known as Focus Areas.  They 
are as follows: 
• Focus Area A – Preparedness Planning and Readiness Assessment 
• Focus Area B – Surveillance and Epidemiology Capacity 
• Focus Area C – Laboratory Capacity – Biologic Agents 
• Focus Area D – Laboratory Capacity – Chemical Agents 
• Focus Area E – Health Alert Network/Communications and Information 
Technology 
• Focus Area F – Risk Communication and Health Information 
Dissemination 
• Focus Area G – Education  and Training 
• HRSA - Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) Hospital 
Preparedness 
On January 16, 2004, the survey was mailed to 109 individuals or job titles.  Of 
the 109 surveys sent, 24 positions were officially unfilled or did not have a specifically 
named person acting as the program manager for that function. Of the 109 mailed, 44 or 
40.3% of the surveys were completed and returned, although a few had little or no data, 
primarily because the person was new to the job.  At least one survey was returned from 
every state with the exception of Arizona.  In May 2004, a follow-up e-mail request was 
sent to key Arizona public health bio-terrorism leadership staff without success.  Most 
states received eight or nine surveys. Nebraska demonstrated the most robust staffing 
pattern by identifying 20 separate leadership positions under the CDC and HRSA grants.  
Interestingly, three of eleven states have vacancies in more than 40% of their leadership 
positions, which is likely to have a direct impact on their level of preparedness. 
The following table outlines the different potentially funded positions under the 
CDC bio-terrorism and HRSA grants cross-referenced against the survey response 
matrix.  When contact information was known a survey letter went to that person by 
name.  When the position had not been filled in 2003, the survey letter in January 2004 
was sent simply to “Focus Area {x} Manager.” 
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For the purposes of survey data compilation, if the position was filled in 
November/December 2003, the cell for that state under that Focus Area received an “X.”  
If a survey reply was received from a previously vacant position, that cell also received 
an “X.”  An empty cell indicates there was no one identified as filling that position in 
2003 and no response to the undesignated letter to that position in 2004.  All cells in the 
HRSA column with “?” indicate that there was no responses from that position and, 
because I did not have a specific HRSA grant contact list to work from, the default 
response was classified as “unknown” or “?” unless a reply was received.  If a reply was 
received, the cell became an “X.”  In some states, the laboratory Focus Areas reside in an 
agency outside the state health agency and, where contact information was provided, 
those collaborating agencies were included in the survey.  It is entirely possible that this 
collaboration is occurring in other states where there was no contact information provided 
for Focus Areas C or D.  This contact information gap, however, could indicate a 
preparedness gap if those resources are not readily available to all state response leaders 
within that state agency. 
A cell containing two “X’s” is an indication that during either the contact 
information phase or the survey response phase, the state health agency stated that one 
person filled both that job and one of the other jobs.  As the time and resource 
requirement for each grant leadership position is extensive, an individual committed to 
two positions further limits that agency’s potential to address both functions adequately 










STATE BT Section 
Chief 
A  B C D E F G HRSA 
Arizona X X X X  X X X X 
Colorado X X X X X X X X X 
Kansas XX XX X    X X X 
Montana X X X XX XX X X X ? 
Nebraska X X X XX XX X X X ? 
North 
Dakota 
X XX X X X  X X XX 
New 
Mexico 
X XX     XX X ? 
Oklahoma X X XX XX XX XX X X X 
South 
Dakota 
X X X X  X XX XX ? 
Utah X X X X  X X X X 
Wyoming X   XX  X XX X ? 
X  = Position Filled 
XX = Two Positions Filled With One Person 
[    ] = Unknown/No Confirmatory Response (November 2003 Telephone Inquiry or 
January 2004 Survey Reply) 
? = Unconfirmed HRSA data 
 
Table 2. State Bio-Terrorism Project Leadership Staffing Pattern 
The spreadsheet of survey findings can be found as Appendix B. 
E. SURVEY FINDINGS 
I developed this survey with the intent of examining the staff leadership patterns 
in the surveyed region, the timing and composition of the emergency preparedness plans, 
and the perceived level of preparedness and success resulting from these products and 
patterns.  The survey in included as Appendix A.  Forty-four replies were received from 
ten of the eleven surveyed states. 
In the initial section of the survey, I sought simply to identify the perspective 
from which the survey respondent was viewing the question.  The bio-terrorism project 
manager should have the most global understanding of the preparedness mandates and 
capabilities, while those in Focus Area A are responsible specifically for establishing all 
preparedness activities and products and the Focus Area F staff are specifically 
responsible for ensuring there are plans and resources in place to communicate risk in a 
bio-terrorism event.  Surveys were only sent to Focus Area Managers but I checked to see 
if other staff responded on behalf of their manager.  Only one survey was received 
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(Colorado Focus Area C) outside the targeted population.  The second survey question 
queried all respondents about whether or not their agency had an emergency response 
plan before September 11, 2001 as an indication of whether or not their agency had a 
focus on emergency preparedness independent of the changes in mission or directed 
funding.  My hypothesis was there would be claims of limited planning with no specific 
expectation of the distribution of responses by position. 
In response to the first two framing questions, of the 44 surveys returned, ten 
individuals (22.7%) listed Focus Area F, or Risk Communications, as one of their 
primary responsibilities and another three (6.8%) respondents stated that they had a 
responsibility for the entire bio-terrorism section in their state.  Another six (13.6%) of 
those surveyed are directly responsible for preparedness planning as leaders of Focus 
Area A. (One Respondent had responsibility for A and F.)  As a group, between these 19 
individuals there is disagreement about whether or not their organization had an 
emergency plan before September 11.  Focus Area A and F representatives from five 
states agree there was a plan, in three states the staff disagreed on whether there was a 
plan, one state’s staff “did not know” and there were no A or F staff from the remaining 
state responding.  There were no A or F respondents from three states, including Arizona.  
As these A and F leaders are likely to have the most insight into the risk communication 
planning efforts, it is difficult to ascertain which plans actually existed at that time.  The 
table below provides a breakdown of each state’s Focus Area leaders that responded to 
the survey.  Persons filling multiple positions are counted as representing both focus 
areas. 
Survey Questions 2 through 6 were developed to collect specific information on 
the composition and complexity of the pre-9/11 plans – particularly whether the plan 
included risk communication planning – and how the plan was used.  In total, 64% of 
those surveyed (N = 28) remarked that their state had an emergency response plan before 
September 11, 2001, 15.9% (N = 7) stated that their state did not have a plan and 20.4% 
(N = 9) did not know. Of those 28 responding that their state did have a plan, 13 or 
46.4% indicated that their plan was significantly robust and addressed five or more 
different hazards or threats.  Fifteen, or 53.5% of the respondents claiming to have a plan, 
affirmed their state used, trained on or exercised their plan regularly.  Unfortunately of 
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the 28 respondents that stated their agency had an emergency response plan, only 8 or 
28.5% representing four states said that their plan contained a risk communication 
component for hazards addressed.  Five of the eight indicated that their risk 
communication plan included more than five of the 19 listed planning components and 
three of those five identified inclusion of more than half of the components. However, 
one of those eight was not sure what aspects or functions of risk communication were 
addressed in the risk communications plan. 
 
STATE BT Section Chief A B C D E F G HRSA 
Arizona          
Colorado X X X X X X X X  
Kansas  X X    X X X 
Montana   X X X  X  X 
Nebraska  X X X X X X X  
North 
Dakota 
X X X  X  X X X 
New 
Mexico 
X X     X   
Oklahoma X   X X  X X  
South 
Dakota 
X  X X      
Utah      X   X 
Wyoming    X   X   
 
Table 3. Focus Area Survey Respondents by State 
 
The diagnosis of Anthrax exposure in Florida, Washington D.C., New York and 
Connecticut in November 2001 put public health agencies in the forefront around the 
country as agencies addressed the potential for exposures in their communities.  In some 
instances, this was a first opportunity for public health agencies to determine risk of 
public health impacts and communicate the risks to the public.  Questions 7 through 9 
were developed to ascertain whether this national public health threat served as an 
initiating event to spur emergency planning functions, whether the plan included risk 
communication – a prominent public health function during that phase – how extensive 




One of the public health bio-terrorism leaders surveyed stated that his agency 
developed an emergency plan during this phase, which also contained a risk 
communication component.  Unfortunately, in spite of all the attention paid to this public 
health hazard, 57.1 % (N = 4) of the survey respondents who stated their agency did not 
have a plan before September 11 acknowledged that their agency still did not have an 
emergency response plan by the end of the Anthrax phase.  Another eleven did not 
know.85  Thirteen of the 29 respondents claiming to have a plan (44.8%) stated that they 
implemented their emergency plan during the Anthrax phase (between October 2001 and 
June 2002.) 
In drafting Questions 11 and 12, I was seeking to understand how prepared the 
respondent felt their agency was to respond and communicate risks during the Anthrax 
phase and how successful they felt their efforts were.  The author’s hypothesis was that 
the individuals reporting the most lengthy and comprehensive planning efforts - whether 
or not plans specifically included risk communication planning – would express the 
highest level of confidence in their preparedness and resulting success. 
The breakdown of perceived level of preparedness of their agency to answer 
questions regarding the risk of anthrax exposure in their state regardless of whether or not 
they had a plan is as follows: 
 
Extremely Prepared 0 
Very Prepared 10 
Prepared 18 
Unprepared 12 
Very Unprepared 0 
Extremely Unprepared 0 
No Answer 4 
 
Table 4. Reported Level of Preparedness to Answer Questions Regarding Anthrax 
Exposure Risk 
                                                 
85 Four respondents that stated they had an emergency plan before September 11, 2001 also claimed 
not to have a plan during the anthrax phase.  This is interpreted as a misunderstanding of the question or an 
error in response and the first affirmative is accepted for the purposes of this study. 
While 40% (N = 2) of the five respondents who noted their agency did not have 
an emergency plan by the end of the Anthrax phase felt their agency was “Unprepared” 
to communicate risk, it is interesting to note that 60% (N = 3) of those without plans 
rated their readiness as “Prepared.”  Two other respondents who did not know if their 
agency had a plan also felt that they were “Prepared” while the other three “Do Not 
Know” respondents that answered the question said they were “Unprepared.” 
Ironically, seven of the of the 28 that claimed to have an emergency plan prior to 
September 11 - an assumed indication of preparedness - responded that they felt 
“Unprepared” to answer questions regarding the risk of Anthrax and the appropriate steps 
to take to mitigate risk.  When comparing the responses to the question of preparedness 
level to perceived success in communicating risk, one would expect to find direct 
correlations.  As there is no actual measure to determine whether the responses 
undertaken by the state health agency were or were not successful in communicating 
about the risks of Anthrax, it is only natural that those who felt prepared would also state 
that they felt their efforts had been successful.  However, when comparing the ratings 
against each other there is variation between the categories of “Prepared” and 
“Unprepared” versus “Successful” and “Unsuccessful” indicating the there was a shift of 
many who felt “Unprepared” ultimately believing that their actions were “Successful.”  A 
comparison of the two ratings follows: 
 
 
Reported Level of 
Preparedness 
 Reported Level of Success 
Communicating Risk 
 
Extremely Prepared 0 Extremely Successful 0 
Very Prepared 10 Very Successful 8 
Prepared 18 Successful 25
Unprepared 12 Unsuccessful 3 
Very Unprepared 0 Very Unsuccessful 0 
Extremely Unprepared 0 Extremely Unsuccessful 0 
Not Applicable 0 Not Applicable  3 
No Answer 4 No Answer 5 
Table 5. Reported Preparedness for Communicating Anthrax Risks Compared to 




                                                
Overall, 75% (N = 33) felt they were “Successful” or “Very Successful” in 
communicating risk.  Of the five individuals who stated their agency did not have an 
emergency response plan by the end of the Anthrax stage, 80% (N = 4) felt they were 
“Successful” nonetheless and 20% (N=1) claimed that their state was not asked to 
communicate risk.  Five people did not answer the question. 
During 2003, the federal government called upon state and local health agencies 
around the nation to undertake a process of vaccinating health responders against a 
potential release of smallpox.  Once again public health agencies were asked to translate 
the risk of smallpox exposure to healthcare workers as an act of bio-terrorism versus the 
risk associated with the vaccine itself.  Questions 13 through 18 were developed as 
indicators of whether this more traditional risk communication function aimed at the 
medical community would compel state health agencies to develop and use emergency 
response plans, whether risk communication would be included and how successful they 
felt they were during this process.  As federal grant funding and preparedness mandates 
were in place in every state by this time, including specific deliverables for smallpox 
planning and communication, my hypothesis was that plans would be put into place and 
implemented. 
According to the Rocky Mountain West public health survey, of the five 
individuals who stated their organization did not have an emergency plan during the 
Anthrax phase, two had a plan before the end of the smallpox vaccination phase.  Three 
individuals who answered “Do Not Know” to other planning questions indicated they had 
an emergency plan by the end of that phase.86  Along with the incorporation of these new 
plans, existing plans were becoming more robust.  Thus, among the 44 survey responses, 
86% (N = 38) confirmed that by 2003 they had an emergency response plan. 
Of the five new plans, four had a risk communication component.  By the end of 
this phase, most respondents indicated that their risk communications plans were 
relatively robust with many identifying eight or more key communication components.  
Eighteen of the 44 respondents (40.9%) reported using their risk communication plan to 
advise healthcare workers or citizens of the risks associated with smallpox vaccine or 
 
86 Four individuals that had earlier reported having a plan reported that they had no plan at the end of 
this phase.  It is likely they interpreted this to mean a smallpox specific plan as required by CDC. 
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vaccinia.  Ten of the 44 (22.7%) reported using their emergency plans to guide how they 
established their immunization clinics.  When asked how successful they thought their 
agency was in communicating risk during the smallpox phase, the breakdown of 
responses was as follows: 
 
Extremely Successful 3 
Very Successful 13 
Successful 19 
Unsuccessful 2 
Very Unsuccessful 0 
Extremely Unsuccessful 0 
Not Applicable 2 
No Answer 5 
 
Table 6. Perceived Success in Communicating Risk During Smallpox Vaccinations 
 
One respondent noted in the comments section that he would rate the ability to 
communicate risk to agencies as “Successful” but their ability to communicate to the 
public as “Unsuccessful.”  This statement identifies a significant issue as public health 
struggles to provide lay interpretation for the citizens of the community as opposed to 
technical data for an informed professional health community.  This same respondent 
also commented in this section that “Currently, and in the past, we provide info as needed 
to individual situations as they arise.”  The reported successes coupled with the 
respondent’s comments potentially indicate a continuation of “business as usual” in state 
public health agency response rather than a shift in mission approach and enhanced or 
expanded emergency preparedness prioritization.  The comment particularly points to a 
lack of ongoing preparedness planning in providing risk communication of indistinct 
technical information to the lay public if the need had arisen to expand the smallpox 
vaccination to include the general public. 
As an indicator of improvement, a comparison between levels of perceived 




Reported Level of Success 
Communicating Risk 
Anthrax Smallpox 
Extremely Successful 0 2 
Very Successful 7 11 
Successful 23 18 
Unsuccessful 3 2 
Very Unsuccessful 0 0 
Extremely Unsuccessful 0 0 
Not Applicable  2 2 
No Answer 4 4 
Table 7. Reported Success Communicating Risk During Anthrax Events Compared 
to the Smallpox Vaccination Process 
 
This table implies that improvement in perceived success has, in fact, occurred.  
There is one less rating in the “Unsuccessful” category and six more at the “Very” or 
“Extremely Successful” rating.  With significantly different communication targets 
between the two events coupled with a difference in time frame – Anthrax 
communication being targeted to the lay public, government officials and first responders 
and the smallpox communication targeted at informed health care professionals one year 
later – it is difficult to correlate the improvement to increased communication skill.  
Perhaps this finding simply notes a connection of the former public health 
communication function with the medical community.  However, if the positive effect 
was tied to acquired knowledge and expertise over time, it is a positive indicator for 
enhanced preparedness. 
In order to look for a relationship between the level of risk communication 
preparedness and the commitment of the state health agency to the function as indicated 
by designation of staff, the survey explored the timing of hiring a risk 
communication/Focus Area F lead.  In drafting Question 19, I sought to determine the 
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relationship between the time when a risk communication lead was hired and the 
respondent’s perception that his or her agency is prepared to communicate risks 
associated with a bio-terrorism event in their state.  I hypothesized that an organization 
that had a risk communication lead prior to September 11, 2001 is likely to be an 
organization committed to ensuring an effective communication structure.  Federal 
funding became available between September 2001 and December 2002 and hiring 
during that phase could indicate that lack of funding was previously a barrier in 
addressing the agency’s risk communication structure long term.  Responses in the 2003 
to 2004+ range could indicate that risk communication is important but perhaps not a 
priority in that state’s emergency preparedness structure.  The same could hold true for 
those answering “It is a shared responsibility.”  A response of “We have no plans to 
identify/hire” and “Unknown” would indicate a relative lack of importance for risk 
communications functions or a very low priority, at best.  The breakdown of responses on 
communication lead hiring was as follows: 
 
<9-11-01 10 
>9-11-01 & <12-31-02 8 
2003 7 
Currently identifying/hiring 4 
2004 1 
No plans to identify/hire 0 
Shared responsibility 3 
Unknown 7 
No answer 4 
 
Table 8. Time Frame for Hiring a Risk Communications Lead 
 
It is encouraging to note that 40.9% (N = 18) of all respondents noted that their 
agency had hired a risk communications lead before the end of 2002 – an indication of an 
organizational priority.  The survey itself does not query whether the individual in charge 
of that function is also in charge of all agency communication functions, whether they 
have training in risk communications or what percentage of that person’s time is split  
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with other bio-terrorism grant functions.  As mentioned earlier, while eight of 44 
respondents said their primary position was in Focus Area F (Risk Communications), two 
said they were responsible for Focus Area F as well as another function. 
The final survey question asked was how prepared the respondent’s agency is to 
answer questions regarding the risks associated with a bio-terrorism event in their state 
and the appropriate steps to mitigate the risk.  The breakdown of responses was as 
follows: 
 
Extremely Prepared 1 
Very Prepared 16 
Prepared 20 
Unprepared 2 
Very Unprepared 0 
Extremely Unprepared 0 
No Answer 5 
 
Table 9. Preparedness to Communicate Bio-terrorism Risks and Mitigation Steps 
 
In total, 84% of the respondents indicate they feel prepared to respond to a public 
health emergency and communicate risk.  Interestingly, the hypothesis that respondents 
from agencies with the most lengthy and comprehensive planning process would also 
express that their agencies were most prepared did not prove out across the board.  Each 
of the three people claiming that their state had no emergency plan reported they felt their 
agency was “Prepared” to answer questions regarding risks. 
As mentioned earlier, it is easy to speculate but virtually impossible to quantify 
the value of an emergency planning strategy when evaluating an effective response to a 
crisis.  Connecting elements of emergency planning to the success of an emergency 
response process that may never be implemented or could be implemented tomorrow 
renders this process highly subjective.  Unfortunately, as lessons learned by the CDC and  
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public health responders in New York and Florida demonstrate, a “trial by fire” of your 
emergency preparedness level in the midst of a response to a bio-terrorism event may 
impact success as well as the agency’s perceived trustworthiness in the future. 
F. DISCUSSION 
We know from anecdotal reports that communities, just like businesses that plan 
ahead how they will respond to a crisis, are less likely to suffer long-term damage.  We 
can document preparedness changes over time in high-impact disaster areas forced to 
establish plans to mitigate damage.  We can also presume that since other organizations 
routinely tested by disasters work to establish messaging protocols that it is also vital that 
state health agencies that are not as frequently challenged do the same.87
It is impossible to determine conclusively whether planning will play the decisive 
role in actual success during a public health emergency or crisis situation.  Most 
communities do not measure or evaluate their emergency planning standards even in 
traditional emergency management organizations.  Emergency planning in public health 
is no different.  There are very few standards or agreed upon approaches that will ensure 
an effective response, little less a response that includes communicating a message in 
understandable terms that will compel citizens to act in their best interests and the best 
interests of their community. What we can show, however, is that organizations that 
routinely respond to emergencies - such as police and fire departments and military 
organizations- plan and practice constantly so that the emergency response behaviors 
become second nature.  Public health agencies routinely address community health 
concerns but very rarely in an emergency situation and virtually never when there is little 
or no scientific data on the actual risks.  It is safe to assume that the skills derived of 
constant emergency preparedness and practice are not well developed in most public 
health agencies.  This is not an indication of the effectiveness of the agency overall but 
simply the development phase the public health system finds itself in and the newness of 
its emergency preparedness mission and resources.  It is also possible to surmise that  
 
87 American Red Cross. “Talking About Disaster: Guide,” American Red Cross Disaster Services 
Webpage.(Available on-line) Available at  http://www.redcross.org/disaster/safety/guide.html, (Accessed 
20 March 2004.) 
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individuals skilled in health communications assume that those same skills will apply 
equally when validated information is limited, community concerns or fears are high, and 
the pressure to communicate rapidly and effectively is paramount.  
Many of the Rocky Mountain West states share the same media markets and, in 
some cases, citizens in one state may only have “local” media coverage from a media 
market of an adjacent state.  Even when a state develops effective plans to provide risk 
communication to its citizens the adjoining states may not have planned at the same level, 
thereby rendering the planning efforts of the residents’ state ineffective for 
communicating risk to its citizens.  The planned risk communication messages may not 
reach all the citizens of the state.  As there are no requirements that all states undertake 
communication planning that is integrated regionally or nationally there are no resources 
to make sure all states are capable of delivering effective messages, little less that the 
messages from various states in the region are consistent. 
Colorado shares its borders with five other states.  The major media markets in 
Colorado are Denver and Colorado Springs.  These two media markets serve the bulk of 
the population of the state, which resides along the eastern side of the Rocky Mountains 
(called “the front range.”)  There are also small cities, including Ft. Collins, Greeley, 
Pueblo and Grand Junction that have several local radio and print media outlets as well as 
television bureaus connected with the front range broadcast media.  The communities 
around the outer edges of the state (often called “frontier communities” because of their 
sparse population, limited resources and remote location) will receive information on 
risks associated with bio-terrorism from the neighboring state.  The following figure 
shows the counties and tribal nations within the State of Colorado, divided up according 
to Homeland Security All-Hazard regions, and from where those citizens receive their 
local news: 
 
Figure 4.   Likely Risk Communication Information Sources for Colorado Residents 
 
Although it does not preclude successful response, it appears from the survey of 
the public health bio-terrorism leaders in the Rocky Mountain West that there is marginal 
or uneven planning underway for how they as organizations will communicate risk in an 
emergency.  At the very least, there are no collaborative planning efforts among these 
states at this time.  One of the most significant issues of note is the disparity in reporting 
about the status or content of their emergency plan from individuals working in the same 
state – generally the same office - on the same project.  One explanation is that many of 
the people responding to the survey stated they were new and that they were simply 
unaware of what was in place.  Normally lack of knowledge in this adjustment phase is 
completely understandable.  However, in a crisis situation, if the key emergency response 
leadership are unaware of the direction or priorities of their organization it is likely that 
the leadership will be delayed in response or, worse yet, working at counter-purposes 
with each other.  The variation in responses may also indicate that the state health 
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agency’s planning process is a formality only and that the process does not migrate 
beyond the bookshelf of the individual compiling the plan therefore rendering it 
essentially meaningless. 
Furthermore, as the most important value in the planning process is derived of the 
relationships formed and conversations undertaken during the planning process, it is a 
likely assumption that their ability to interface effectively and cooperatively with external 
agencies during an emergency is significantly hampered.  If there is not a coordinated 
communication effort (whether that is within the organization or with partner agencies) 
there is an elevated chance that conflicting risk information will be provided within a 
community, state or region.  This is particularly true for areas with overlapping media 
markets.  When conflicting information is released, confidence in the source of the 
information is diminished and the groundwork is laid in that community for a significant 
increase in fear reactions and reduced effectiveness of the indicated response. 
G. INCORPORATING PREPAREDNESS LESSONS LEARNED 
Based on my interpretation of the survey findings, I assert that the most effective 
means of addressing planning shortfalls is to learn from the experiences of agencies that 
found themselves in a like response position during the terrorism events of 2001.  I 
conducted interviews with the two persons who led the communication efforts of the 
CDC during the Anthrax event as well as the individual brought on board afterwards to 
address communications challenges the agency confronted.  Marsha Vanderford, Ph.D., 
is the CDC Acting Associate Director, Office of Communications, working directly 
under Julie Gerberding, MD, MPH, Director of the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention and Administrator of the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 
(ATSDR).  Dr. Vanderford coordinated the CDC communications response to the 
Anthrax events in all of the impacted regions.  Jana Telfer, M.A., also of the Office of 
Communications, directed the media relations functions for the CDC and was 
interviewed to gather lessons learned from communicating risk to the national media.  
Dan Baden, M.D., Senior Medical Advisor in the Office of Communications, CDC 
Office of the Director, was appointed after the Anthrax events had taken place for the 
purposes of helping address risk communications challenges within a new CDC 
emergency response structure and  
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facility, called the Emergency Communications System or, simply, the ECS.  The 
common focus of all three CDC interviews was the explanation of the communication 
challenges posed and resources required to launch a response to a bio-terrorism event. 
CDC acknowledges that over 81 spokespersons were used to communicate during 
the Anthrax event and that some were removed from that assignment because, in spite of 
their expertise on the science of the event, they lacked the specific skills necessary to 
translate the risks to the media and the public.  Dr. Vanderford, who led their 
communication functions during the Anthrax event, stated: 
We need a fairly deep bench.  We try to use a few spokespersons that are 
familiar to the public and can speak across the spectrum of issues and 
topics and subject matter experts on specific details.  […] A press officer 
helps the spokesperson with talking points and spokespersons and 
scientists get routine media training.88
Vanderford remarks that CDC changed its approach to risk communication after 
Anthrax. 
None of the scientists and subject matter experts thinks that 
communication is not important or part of the science anymore.  
Communications staff is always at the table now.  Emergency 
communications work hand in glove with scientists to create and deliver 
the messages.89
Changing the CDC approach to integrate communications with the operational 
priorities required planning to the point that they established the ECS shortly thereafter.  
According to Dr. Baden, their new planning approach now includes four different 
preparedness levels: 
• WATCH – the agency is following potential events;  
• LEANING FORWARD – the agency is preparing, developing materials, 
and identifying communication gaps;  
• ENGAGED – An event appears to be beginning. The agency is collecting 




88 Marsha Vanderford Interview. 
89 Ibid. 
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• ACTIVATED – An event is confirmed.  CDC deploys staff and is 
working closely with communication leads in the agency’s centers, 
institutes and offices.  Lists are developed and maintained of what each 
team is doing.90 
In spite of the obvious planning and risk communication preparedness activities 
underway at CDC, when discussing the role of state preparedness planning in 
determining the potential for communication success during a response Dr. Vanderford 
adds: 
In reality, many risk communication practices and strategies have been in 
place for decades.  Doing good communication practice means having the 
skills and the knowledge of communication processes.  Developing an 
actual plan is a good way to get people to think about communication but 
it is a disservice to people with good skills to believe they can’t 
communicate effectively without a plan.91
Any time there is an implied critique of state activities by federal agencies there is the 
potential for disagreement and perceptions of oppressive funding oversight.  However, 
states will not be compelled to plan effectively if not provided standards and guidance 
from lessons learned to highlight the potential implications of being ill-prepared.  
The Florida Department of Health serves as an excellent example of the value of 
planning as well as risk communication planning.  The Palm Beach County Health 
Department had significant experience responding to a myriad of public health 
emergencies prior the Anthrax events in Boca Raton in October 2001.  This agency -
serving a population of over a million through six health centers - also had staffing 
resources beyond the standard generally available in the survey group.92  They also had a 
very active emergency preparedness structure and still found themselves challenged by 
bio-terrorism.  Timothy O’Connor, Public Information Director for the Palm Beach 
County Health Department, also completed the survey developed for the Rocky Mountain 
West health departments.  By all accounts they were very well prepared to respond to 
bio-terrorism.  The Palm Beach County Health Department had and routinely used an 
emergency response plan (that included an extensive risk communication component) 
 
90 Dan Baden Interview. 
91 Marsha Vanderford Interview. 
92 Palm Beach County Health Department, Website homepage [on-line] (Accessed 20 March 2004) 
Available from http://www.pbchd.com, Internet. 
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prior to 2001.  They considered themselves “Very Prepared” but were, nonetheless, 
confronted with the struggles resulting from a response that required 12 people working 
12 hour shifts for three weeks.  O’Connor classified their response as “Work until you 
drop (because) time is of the essence.”93  Since that time their emergency planning 
process has “all been revamped, re-evaluated and expanded” including establishing 
cooperatives with other agencies and developing inter-local agreements to support future 
response.94  Luckily, Florida Health - as part of their planning process - had designated 
spokespersons with good preparation and skills and was able to communicate 
successfully in spite of the challenges confronting them. 
It is entirely possible that when a public health emergency occurs in the Rocky 
Mountain West region, the states will rise to the task, organize their internal emergency 
response functions, and clarify issues related to defining the hazards and explaining the 
risks to the lay public and the media effectively.  As noted previously, public health 
officials address community and state-wide public health concerns every day.  However, 
response to an actual public health crisis – particularly a bio-terrorism event – will call 
upon organizational, communication skills and leadership skills that far surpass the day-
to-day operations.  The Florida Anthrax response is a case in point.  Some individuals 
will be comfortable moving into an emergency response role and assuming daunting 
tasks without a great deal of practice while others will need a repeated process to learn 
how to effectively assimilate their routine approach to an emergency situation.  This 
transition holds true in communicating risk in a crisis. 
Without an element of planning within the state, little less between adjoining 
states, the stage is set for public health in the Rocky Mountain West to create confusing 
and detrimental risk communication processes should the region be impacted by a bio-
terrorism event.  Distance and geological barriers alone blur the boundaries and 
capabilities from one state to another.  In states with sparsely populated regions such as 
those included in this survey, citizens in the distant reaches of the state often express  
 
93 Timothy O’Connor Interview. 
94 Ibid. 
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greater affiliation with a neighboring state because of easier access to their metropolitan 
areas.  Ineffective risk communication planning in one state will naturally impact media 
reports viewed in neighboring states and, consequently, public reaction and response.   
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The survey of state public health agencies reviewed in this chapter was intended 
to provide a snapshot of state preparedness activities in Colorado and its region.  I was 
looking for trends and timing of these activities as these relate to the availability of 
funding and the perceived prioritization of the newly established public health emergency 
response mission.  The findings from the survey, while giving encouraging signs that 
progress is being made, also indicate that because of decades of system-wide neglect 
public health may not be getting far enough fast enough if a bio-terrorism attack 
occurred.  Providing historical data on the approach to bio-terrorism preparedness in this 
nation serves as the underpinning necessary to truly understand the level of difficulty 
associated with transitioning public health into a fully prepared emergency response 
resource.  The survey confirms that absolute changes have not taken place.  Years of 
continued support coupled with improved access to threat information will be necessary 
to prompt an acceptance of an actual mission change and expanded emergency 
preparedness approach. 
It is understandable that public health emergency planning before 2001 was 
limited.  Prior to the terrorist events of September 2001, it was not a primary mission in 
public health and most, if not all, state public health agencies lacked the staffing and 
financial resources to seriously undertake this type of activity.  However, with the drastic 
escalation in funding, the future will show whether the public health system has truly 
accepted emergency preparedness and response as an integral mission or whether the 
efforts described by survey respondents are simply a manifestation of a generous funding 
opportunity. 
Furthermore, it is only through response to an actual event that states will 
determine whether the plans they have in place are adequate to organize their emergency 
response efforts.  Public risk communication capacity will be critical to effective public 
health response and there appears to be a sense that this readiness exists.  It remains to be 
seen if this confidence is an artifact of communication successes with the medical 
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community or whether those resources are truly in place.  Potentially this confidence may 
be exhibited simply because these agencies have never been directly involved in a risk 
communication activity undertaken without the benefit of irrefutable technical content 
and the luxury of time and assume it will be no different than standard public health 
communication functions.  If this is true, the logical recommendation follows that 
standards be established for risk communications training in all state public health 
agencies and that all risk communicators have ready access to uniform nationwide risk 
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V. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS THROUGH PLANNING 
In 1875, while introducing his Public Health Act to British Parliament, Prime 
Minister Benjamin Disraeli remarked that:  
Public Health is the foundation for the happiness of the people and the 
power of the country.  The care of the Public Health is the first duty of a 
statesman.95
This quote highlights the importance of public health systems in maintaining the 
welfare of a nation.  This role was confirmed by the National Strategy for the Physical 
Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets which states: “Hospitals, clinics, 
and public health systems play a critical role in mitigating and recovering from the effects 
of natural disasters or deliberate attacks on the homeland.”96  A recent report from the 
Council for Excellence in Government found that in spite of efforts in recent years to 
prepare and inform the public “there is an information gap that exists now between 
citizens and government.” Three-fourths of the citizens interviewed felt that another 
attack would occur soon but they did not know how to protect themselves.  Furthermore, 
“citizens said they were most worried about bio-terrorism, followed by chemical 
weapons, nuclear weapons, suicide bombings, airplane hijackings and, lastly, 
cyberterrorism.”97  Conversely, resources committed and preparedness activities 
undertaken nationally do not seem to mirror these community priorities. 
This thesis has documented the vital role of public health as critical infrastructure 
in response to a bio-terrorism event but has also shown the structural weaknesses of a 
system in disrepair and generally unaccustomed to response to catastrophic emergency 
 
95 National Advisory Council on SARS and Public Health. Learning from SARS – Renewal of Public 
Health in Canada, [report on-line] (Health Canada Publications, October 2003, Accessed 22 March 2004) 
Available from http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/english/pdf/sars/sars-e.pdf, Internet, 220. 
96 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 
Infrastructures and Key Assets [strategy on-line] (Accessed 31 May 2004) Available from 
http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/Physical_Strategy.pdf, Internet, 41. 
97 Chris Strohm, Americans on Homeland Security: Ready and Willing but Uninformed, [on-line] (25 
May 2004) Available at: www.govexec.com/story_cfm, (Accessed 2 June 2004.) 
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events.98  Decades of political indifference and inadequate funding for this essential 
system led to these structural weaknesses and now public health leaders nationwide must 
strive to meet the challenges inherent to bio-terrorism response.  The question remains 
whether these public health leaders are truly focused on bio-terrorism, or at least, 
emergency preparedness, or simply perceive this as a tangible funding mechanism to 
shore up their organizational shortfalls until public health falls from the national radar 
screen yet again.  Rebuilding the system will take time and enduring support.  Additional 
resources and imperatives must accompany this support to move the system beyond 
“stabilized” to “prepared” to face the challenges of a bio-terrorism response. 
Furthermore, this thesis has established that the only way for public health to 
adequately prepare to respond to a bio-terrorism event is through a concerted planning 
effort and, specifically, planning efforts that address the pivotal public health response 
issue – risk communication to the public.  The public health response challenges to the 
Anthrax attack and SARS outbreak provided an important opportunity for public health 
to examine its emergency preparedness policies and strategies as well as to analyze its 
methods of communicating on an unknown disease as science was being made.  Case 
studies from China, Toronto, and Singapore outlined three different approaches to 
communicating risk as well as the effect of that strategy locally as well as internationally.  
Singapore was lauded by risk communication experts for its direct approach, while 
Canada received praise from the public and scathing criticism from the medical 
community.  China, however, was faulted nationally and internationally for not only their 
unwillingness to communicate information on the risk but their efforts to withhold 
information on the outbreak entirely.  A Journal of the American Medical Association 
(JAMA) article comparing SARS responses in Hong Kong and Canada included among 
five key lessons learned two that reinforce the conclusions of this thesis: 
• Because of its preventative and population focus, the public health system 
is consistently overshadowed by other areas of health care…investments 
in public health are vitally important for health protection…; and, 
 
98 The White House, Defending Against Biological Terrorism, [on-line] (Accessed 28 April 2004) 
Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/bio-terrorism/index.html, Internet. 
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• Communication within health care and the public health system, with the 
media and with the public, and between nations is a cornerstone of crisis 
management.99 
A recommendation was made in the report that health agencies “train institutional, 
public health, and health care leaders in risk and crisis communications.”100  It is likely 
that these lessons and recommendations could be applied globally in SARS as well as in 
bio-terrorism response. 
Chapter III addressed critical dynamics that come into play when attempting to 
communicate risk and the public fear and distrust that develop when the communication 
efforts are ineffective.  Researchers agree that there are specific elements of risk 
communication that are different from typical modes of communicating in a crisis.  Risk 
communication includes elements of choice and potentially serious consequences 
resulting from those choices.  In order to prepare to provide effective risk 
communication, potential emergency scenarios must be created, credible and experienced 
spokespersons must be identified and coached, messaging must be considered, audiences 
must be identified, and methods of communication must be addressed.  Through a 
successful communication effort there is a greater likelihood that fear will be reduced and 
that effective steps will be taken by the public to ameliorate the situation and move 
toward individual and community-wide recovery. 
More than virtually any other service that public health provides, communication 
of health information rapidly, effectively and credibly is necessary to maintain the trust of 
the public beyond the confines of the emergency event taking place.  Once lost, public 
trust is a commodity that is very difficult, if not impossible, to regain.  Communicating in 
an emergency is also difficult and resource intensive.  By coupling the need for resources 
with an inexperienced communicator in an emergency situation - particularly a 
communicator that is insensitive to the emotional impact of the words and gestures - 
public health agencies have a true recipe for disaster.  Planning will allow the agency to  
 
99 C. David Naylor, Cyril Chantler and Sian Griffiths, “Learning from SARS in Hong Kong and 
Toronto,” JAMA, 26 May 2004, (Vol. 291, No. 20):2487. 
100 Ibid., 2486. 
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gather resources, examine and practice potential emergency situations, develop messages 
beforehand and practice delivery and increase confidence in the process should the 
system be required.  
Unfortunately, Chapter IV demonstrates that emergency planning as well as risk 
communications planning has not been a high priority in the Rocky Mountain West.  
After more than two years of bio-terrorism funding from DHHS/CDC, many of the 
surveyed states continue to show leadership staff vacancies or attempt to meet staffing 
requirements by assigning leaders in multiple roles.  A few states in the region still do not 
have definitive plans for how they will respond to an emergency as an agency, let alone 
how they will coordinate with federal agencies and neighboring states while also 
communicating directly with the public.  Granted, in spite of limited planning efforts, 
effective responses do result following unplanned events and some individuals may show 
a natural ability to communicate risk even in situations where the information is limited 
and ambiguous.  However, health agencies must consider that during a bio-terrorism 
event, their staff may be experiencing concern for themselves, their family and their 
community, which can easily undermine the most highly trained and skilled 
communicator.  Add in confounding factors - such as exhaustion, media presence and 
logistical challenges – without a planned support system to correct or augment these 
deficits, the organization risks losing its capability to reduce fear and influence behavior 
in the preferred direction. 
Ironically, resources have been developed for state and local health agencies to 
facilitate effective communication planning but state and local planners may not be 
familiar with them nor have the time available to study them or implement their usage.  
CDC contracted with the Oak Ridge Institute of Science and Education (ORISE) to 
update and redesign an internal communication planning system used by them since 
1998.  In February 2001, CDCynergy was released and participants from public health 
agencies around the nation were trained as trainers by CDC and ORISE in cooperation 
with the Prospect Center of the American Institutes of Research.  Since then, the product 
has expanded to include simple-to-use templates and numerous resources to provide the 
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framework for an emergency risk communications plan.101  However, since its initial 
promotion and distribution it is unknown how widely publicized the product remains.  As 
the lead public health planner for Colorado since 2000, I was not included in the early 
product distribution process.  The history of the product on the CD notes that “Because 
many health communication groups at the CDC were hesitant to adopt either the original 
or the newly revised version of CDCynergy, the Director of the Office of 
Communication, Dr. Vicki Freimuth suggested that the various Centers, Institutes, and 
Offices (CIOs) of the CDC be approached with the idea of developing tailored editions of 
CDCynergy.”102
According to the CDC, over 7400 copies of the CDCynergy CD-Rom were 
distributed and more than 3800 public health workers around the nation were trained in 
its use103  However, with new and changing staffing patterns, I was unable to ascertain if 
the distribution of this dynamic tool was ongoing and whether the associated training 
cycle meets the needs of state health departments.  Although state health agencies 
generally sponsor their Communications Directors as members of the National Public 
Health Info Coalition which routinely provides CDCynergy training at its meetings, this 
coalition does not necessarily include Focus Area F (Risk Communication) leaders and 
definitely does not reach public health planners working under Focus Area A 
(Preparedness Planning and Readiness Assessment).  It is possible that plans have not 
been developed in the survey region simply because of lack of awareness of this valuable 
product. 
In summary, this research project has led to three critical findings.  First, little 
planning and practice is underway specifically aimed at preparing state public health 
departments to communicate risk in a bio-terrorism event.  Second, staffing patterns in 
public health emergency response leadership may be so austere that there will be great 
difficulty rapidly organizing a coherent response strategy.  And third, if state public 
health cannot organize a rapid emergency response function it will immediately fall 
behind on the essential requirements of effective risk communication: 
 
101 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Emergency Risk Communication CDCynergy: Your 
Guide to Effective Risk Communication Planning, [CD ROM] 2002. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Dan Baden Interview. 
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Have one consistent message. Get it out rapidly. And be accurate.104
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
If states are going to be prepared to respond to bio-terrorism, each state health 
agency should be accountable for the development and use of a reasonable emergency 
response plan.  The Rocky Mountain West states have received more than $260 million 
for bio-terrorism preparedness yet many states have yet to hire staff or establish 
emergency plans.  Because of the dire situation in public health prior to the advent of 
federal bio-terrorism funding, it is necessary for public health agencies to have dual 
purposes for the money expended but, nonetheless, the intent of the funding is to prepare 
for emergency events.  To facilitate the process, CDC or the Department of Homeland 
Security should outline planning templates that would not only assist state agencies in 
planning across state borders but also across disciplines in accordance with the National 
Response Plan.  The CDC funding to states currently comes with a long list of 
deliverables to be completed but without significant resources and tools, such as a 
planning template, to get projects underway.  These templates could also serve as a 
vehicle for uniformity across state borders to ensure that populations served by media 
markets outside their state would receive the same services and messages as they would 
from their own state leadership.  An obvious component of these planning templates 
would be products to establish at least a rudimentary risk communication plan. 
Ironically, the first “Public Health Initiative” identified in the Public Health 
section of the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures 
and Key Assets states that public health will: “Designate trusted communicators.”105
Specifically when addressing this initiative, the strategy states: 
HHS will work with state and local public health officials to identify, 
appoint, train, and prepare recognized subject matter experts to speak on 
behalf of the public health sector in times of crisis.  These appointees 
would act as important envoys of homeland security information to 
communicate consistent, accurate information, as well as to inform, 
instruct, and reassure the American public.106
 
104 Ibid. 
105 U. S. Department of Homeland Security, 41. 
106 Ibid. 
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Having studied the preparedness activities of this region, I recommend that the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) seriously examine the status of this 
initiative in state and local health agencies.  If risk communication planning is limited in 
some parts of the nation as implied in the survey, there is a potential that risk 
communication planning is limited elsewhere in the nation. 
It would also be helpful if HHS clearly and readily established standards by which 
state subject matter experts could be identified and trained as well as provide a forum 
through which this pool of experts could regularly receive uniform continuing education 
and contact with their colleagues in neighboring states.  Following the thread established 
in the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key 
Assets, I searched for “communications training” in the HHS website as this would be a 
likely approach for state leadership attempting to address this training mandate.  Even 
after launching the search from the “Disasters and Emergencies” page the only links 
provided were to training information on food safety, health science librarians, AIDS, 
Food and Drug Administration, informatics and National Institute of Health clinical 
training.  There was also has a link to training for an actual bio-terrorism program - the 
National Pharmaceutical Stockpile (now called the Strategic National Stockpile) – but it 
did not show any stockpile training dates scheduled after September 9-13, 2002.107This 
proposed forum or information portal should serve as a centerpiece of a communication 
repository for sharing resources and lessons learned for the purpose of incorporating best 
practices from emergency planning efforts and response activities nationwide.  On the 
positive side, CDC has made great strides in creating valuable emergency and risk 
communications materials available on their website 
(http://www.cdc.gov/communication/emergency/erc_overview.htm).  This function 
should be supported and further enhanced to serve as a receptacle of information for 
organizations without plans or communication resources when faced with an emergency 
situation. 
Unfortunately, as public health was faced with an abrupt infusion of money for 
bio-terrorism response without stable infrastructure to support it, many optimal 
 
107 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. [home page on-line] (Washington, D.C., 
Accessed 31 May 2004.) Available from http://www.firstgov.gov/fgsearch/index.jsp, Internet. 
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approaches will be unavailable in the short term.  The learning curve has been steep for 
individuals unaccustomed to emergency planning and an actively-promoted centralized 
information clearinghouse would facilitate the learning process.  CDC should also 
develop template messages and informational materials (translated into multiple 
languages) and make them available through their website.  Granted, each event is 
different and key messages will need to be adjusted to accommodate the unique nature of 
the event, but standardized language provides critical resources in the first hours and days 
and lays the groundwork for the development of consistent risk communication 
nationwide. 
Risk communication training curricula should be developed by CDC that would 
allow states to facilitate face-to-face coaching of their own potential spokespersons in the 
subtleties of risk communication, much like CDC has done with its spokespersons since 
the Anthrax events.  State and local health agencies have skilled spokespersons but their 
specific risk communication training is likely limited.  The subject matter expert forum 
recommended above is an excellent first step but state and local communication experts 
must develop relationships with and confidence in the skill level of their subject matter 
experts serving as spokespersons should an event occur.  Skill-development training 
should be crafted for maximum convenience and the least negative impact on the 
schedules of these already tightly scheduled individuals.  Risk communication must be 
integrated into the agency’s organizational culture and practiced continually to be 
effective when the time arrives. 
Lastly, risk communication objectives should be incorporated into all bio-
terrorism exercises supported by federal funds.  Organizations rarely believe that their 
building will burn someday but they carry out fire drills regularly to ensure that the 
knowledge of the appropriate steps will be instilled if that time ever comes.  State and 
local counter-terrorism exercises frequently focus on explosive and incendiary scenarios, 
as well as chemical and radiological agents rather than biologics.  These exercises 
provide a scene from which to operate, and allow more hands-on interaction - particularly 
for traditional first responders and emergency managers -, but they do not help this nation 
prepare to respond to bio-terrorism. 
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Often traditional first responders engage in bio-terrorism exercises using 
Department of Homeland Security money without even a requirement to actually involve 
public health partners.  This situation cannot and will not happen in a real bio-terrorism 
event where the epidemiological investigation occurs in public health agencies, clinics, 
hospitals and laboratories.   
Furthermore, when bio-terrorism exercises are undertaken, the focus is frequently 
on the mechanics of decontaminating and treating the victims and providing prophylaxis.  
Recently, the process of forensic epidemiology has come into exercise play but rarely has 
the risk communication component been tested.  As the situation in Florida demonstrated, 
states must have a plan on how public health risk communication and law enforcement 
investigation will work in tandem to reduce the fear in the community and lead to 
effective protective strategies without compromising the criminal investigation.  There 
should be a requirement for every state to periodically test its inter-disciplinary 
effectiveness during scheduled exercises to identify problems – whether skill based, 
logistical, or technology-based.  These communications exercises should include federal 
as well as local partners identified in the state’s emergency plans. 
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Ideally, a survey to determine the preparedness level of public health to 
communicate risk in a bio-terrorism event should have a more varied sample than eleven 
states tied together primarily by geography.  It would be valuable to ascertain whether the 
planning strategies employed by public health agencies within the Rocky Mountain West 
– an area with generally low population density – are similar to or different from those 
used where the population is dense and support resources are closer at hand.  Often in the 
western states where topography and climate are barriers for connecting jurisdictions, 
there is confidence in being able to handle an event with little or no outside help.  This 
sense of confident independence may have stifled the interest in planning.  On the other 
hand, it is possible that plans were not developed simply because emergency 
preparedness was not a primary focus of public health before September 11, 2001 and the 
agencies did not have the staff or funding to undertake those processes. 
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Potentially, a sample survey of state public health planning activities throughout 
the nation coupled with a survey of reported interest and commitment of the leadership in 
the emergency preparedness mission would be insightful.  Public health funding support 
has been limited in recent years and it is likely that these agencies perceive that the 
current support and mission priority as time limited.  Without additional research, it is 
difficult to hypothesize the impact of this leadership perception on the extent and 
prioritization of emergency planning efforts.  It is also safe to say that if this funding is 
not maintained long term, public health leadership will return to traditional roles and 
priorities with the expectations that they will respond to the best of their capabilities to 
emergencies when they occur as they did before 2001. 
A more narrowed study would be valuable to learn more about the level of 
experience, training and focus that the Rocky Mountain West Focus Area F or risk 
communication project leads possess.  It is quite likely, based on the survey findings 
outlined in Chapter IV, that these responsibilities have been tacked on to other grant 
activities or absorbed by the communications staff of the agency without regard to the 
specificity of the function.  It is conceivable that a public health communicator used to a 
standard mode of communicating will need specialized training and resources to become 
accustomed to this new approach.  Based on the lessons learned from the CDC response 
to Anthrax, the communicators will be stretched thin under the best of circumstances.  A 
person charged with leading the communications function as well as another project will 
probably find themselves unable to adequately address both.  As discussed in Chapter III, 
a lack of emphasis on effective risk communication will likely impact the fear reaction in 
the community and post-event recovery. 
Finally, it would be interesting to research how the leadership of the state health 
departments surveyed perceived the level of preparedness within their state.  If there was 
confusion or disparity within the leadership of the various bio-terrorism project areas 
within a state agency, it is likely that the information is even more limited at points 
farther removed from the hub.  Overall, much research needs to be done to outline what 
constitutes “prepared” in public health emergency response – above and beyond 
terrorism.  As public health is new to the emergency response field, there is a vast 
difference in interpretation of the hazards public health should be able to address, the 
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roles of public health in emergency response and the standards that should be applied to 
ensure progress is being made.  CDC is scheduled to release performance indicators in 
the coming year to serve as benchmarks upon which preparedness metrics can be built.  
This is a start, but if there are no uniform standards of preparedness it will be difficult to 
measure progress and ensure a level of public health capacity nationwide.   
In December 2003, Trust for America's Health, a Washington-based organization 
chaired by former Senator Lowell P. Weicker Jr. (R/Ind-CT) and including retired 
Senator Mark Hatfield, (R-OR), released a state-by-state scorecard of public health 
emergency preparedness and resultant vulnerability.  Overall, the report concluded that 
although progress had been made in improving emergency communication networks, 
laboratory capacity and “initial bio-terrorism plans…states have achieved piecemeal 
progress, but that a full-scale effort to comprehensively fix the nation's public health 
system is falling short.”108  The study noted that these positive changes took place when 
the federal government increased funding from $67 million in fiscal 2001 to $940 million 
in fiscal 2002 but noted that: “…the overall preparedness effort has been compromised 
by the impact of state budget crises, the lack of priority placed on addressing systemic 
weakness and the failure to eliminate bureaucratic obstacles.”109  If public health is to 
successfully prepare to address bio-terrorism, limitations in ability to communicate risk 
will be secondary to its ability to sustain the focus on the effort at all. 
 
108 Martin Edwin Andersen, “States Barely Better Prepared for Bioterror, Study Says,” CQ 
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APPENDIX B.  PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEY RESULTS 
Respondent Q 1 Q 2 Circled Q 3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20
Data Entry Y, N, 
DNK
# Circled Y, N Y, N Y, N #, U Y, N, 
P, 
DNK
Y, N #, U Y, N EP, VP, 
P, U, VU, 
EU
ES, VS, S, 





Y, N #, U Y, N Y, N ES, VS, S, 
U, VU, EU, 
NA
# EP, VP, 
P, U, VU, 
EU
CO1 Y 6 Y Y N P Y P NA P N 6 Y N VS 3 P
CO2 Y 8 Y 0 N Y N N VP VS Y Y 9 Y Y S 2 VP
CO3 DNK DNK P S P Y 9 Y N U 2 P
CO4 Y 5 N N 0 U DNK P S DNK S 8 VP
CO5 N DNK U S Y Y 0 Y N S 3 P
CO6 Y 9 N N Y 2 P 0 U S Y Y 9 N N VS 2 P
CO7 Y 10 N N Y 3 P 1 U S Y Y 10 N N VS 3 P
KS1 N N P S Y Y U Y Y S 2 VP
KS2 Y 2 N Y N P 0 P NA Y Y 17 Y N S 2 P
KS3 Y 3 Y Y N P Y P S P N S 1 VP
KS4 DNK 1 0 0 0 0 DNK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
KS5 N N U NA Y Y U Y Y ES 2 VP
MT1 N N P S N S 3 P
MT3 DNK 0 0 0 0 0 DNK 0 0 0 0 0 DNK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT2 DNK DNK U S DNK NA 4 U
MT4 DNK 0 0 0 0 0 DNK 0 0 0 0 0 DNK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NE1 Y 1 Y Y N N U S Y Y 8 Y N VS 3 VP
NE2 Y 3 Y Y Y 7 Y Y 12 Y VP S Y Y 16 Y Y ES 8 VP
NE3 Y 2 N N N P Y P S P 0 0 0 0 S 7 P
NE4 Y 3 Y Y 0 0 P Y 0 0 P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NE5 Y 8 Y N Y 12 P 0 VP VS P Y 12 0 0 ES 1 EP
NE6 Y 2 N Y N N U U Y Y 8 Y Y S 3 P
NE7 Y 2 N Y N N U U Y Y 8 Y Y S 3 P
NE8 N N U S N S 5 P
NE9 DNK DNK P S Y Y 11 Y Y VS 8 VP
ND1 N N P S N S 2 P
ND2 DNK DNK P S DNK VS 1 VP
ND3 Y 1 Y N N N VP VS N VS 1 VP
ND4 Y 7 N Y Y 7 P Y VP VS Y Y 16 Y N VS 7 VP
ND5 DNK DNK P S DNK VS 1 VP
ND6 DNK DNK U 0 DNK 0 8 0
OK1 Y 2 N N N N P S P N S 8 P
OK2 Y 3 Y Y N P Y P VS Y Y U Y Y VS 8 VP
OK3 Y 3 N N N Y Y 7 Y P S P Y 9 Y N S 4 P
OK4 Y 2 N N N N P S P N S 8 P
NM1 Y 1 Y 0 N P Y U S Y Y 0 Y Y S 4 P
NM2 Y 5 Y Y N P Y P U Y N U 4 U
SD1 N Y Y 2 N VP S N VS 1 P
SD2 Y 1 Y Y N Y Y 15 Y P S N NA 2 P
SD3 Y 5 N N N P N U S N VS 7 P
UT1 Y 7 Y Y Y 13 Y Y 15 Y VP S Y Y 16 Y Y S 1 VP
UT2 Y 7 Y Y Y 13 P Y VP VS Y Y S 1 VP
UT3 Y 6 Y Y Y U P N VP VS P Y U Y N S 1 VP
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